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FAMILY LAW—MATERNAL AND JOINT CUSTODY PRESUMPTIONS
FOR UNMARRIED PARENTS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY CON
SIDERATIONS IN MASSACHUSETTS AND BEYOND
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has concluded that unmarried fathers and
children born out of wedlock are afforded the same constitutional
protections as their counterparts in marriage.1 Even so, the rights
of the unmarried father and his child continue to be discussed and
argued at length by psychologists, scholars, judges, and students.2
At the same time, jurisdictions across the United States have
revised their custody statutes to reflect our changing culture and the
evolving roles of parents postdivorce.3 Judges are no longer bound
by custodial presumptions in favor of the mother; most states have
abolished any explicit maternal-preference standard.4 However,
many states continue to treat the unwed father5 differently than the
unwed mother or divorcing parents. Massachusetts, for example,
maintains a statutory custodial presumption in favor of the unwed
1. See Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (holding that the state cannot
discriminate against children born out of wedlock); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658
(1972) (holding that denying unwed father a hearing on his parental fitness while grant
ing same to all other parents was unconstitutional); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158, 166 (1944) (holding as fundamental the right for a parent to care for and raise his
child). However, these protections have been qualified, especially those of the unmar
ried father. See Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (requiring something
more than a biological link alone before an unmarried father can invoke constitutional
protection).
2. See, e.g., RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION: THE FATHER
FACTOR AND THE MOTHERHOOD MYSTIQUE (1992); David D. Meyer, The Constitu
tional Rights of Non-Custodial Parents, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1461 (2006); Hon. Sharon
S. Townsend, Fatherhood: A Judicial Perspective: Unmarried Fathers and the Changing
Role of the Family Court, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 35 (2003); Stacy L. Hill, Note, Putative
Fathers and Parental Interests: A Search for Protection, 65 IND. L.J. 939 (1990).
3. See infra notes 34-39.
4. William Weston, Putative Fathers’ Rights to Custody–A Rocky Road at Best, 10
WHITTIER L. REV. 683, 690 (1989).
5. The unwed or unmarried father is a broad category used in this Note to encom
pass putative, acknowledged, and adjudicated fathers. The putative father is “[t]he al
leged biological father of a child born out of wedlock.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 683
(9th ed. 2009). An acknowledged father is one who has a legally recognized relation
ship with his nonmarital child. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.201(b) (Vernon
2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-402(a)(i) (2009). An adjudicated father is one who has
been judicially determined to be the father of the nonmarital child. See, e.g., WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 14-2-402(a)(ii).
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mother, leaving the unwed father with an uphill battle to gain equal
rights and equal access to his child.6 Other jurisdictions create a
statutory presumption in favor of joint custody, giving both parents
equal rights to their children and equal footing in the courtroom.7
Controversy swirls around the justifications for awarding cus
tody to one or both of divorcing or unmarried parents and the vari
ous effects different custody awards have on the children.8 The
statistics, however, cannot be disputed: In 2007, of the 19 million
marital children9 under the age of eighteen that live with one par
ent, only 12.5% of them live with their father.10 And of the 7.5
million nonmarital children11 that live with an unmarried parent,
only 7% reside with their father.12 Regardless of the arguments
submitted by proponents and opponents to joint custody, in the
overwhelming majority of single-parent scenarios, the mother is the
primary physical custodian of the child.
This Note examines the statutory custodial presumptions that
distinguish the unmarried father from the unmarried mother, as
well as from divorcing parents, with a focus on Massachusetts legal
custody awards. Given the gender-based distinction built into these
statutes and the distinctions drawn between the putative father and
the divorcing father, this Note first asks if these statutes are subject
6. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10 (2008); see also infra Part V.E. Although
the statute’s provision for custody of nonmarital children operates as an automatic
maternal-custody award, this Note will use the term presumption to include the Massa
chusetts custody scheme.
7. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010) (“There
shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in the best interest of the child or
children . . . .”); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)(2) (West Supp. 2010) (“The court shall
order that the parental responsibility for a minor child be shared by both parents unless
the court finds that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp. 2010) (“The court shall use a rebuttable
presumption that upon the request of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the
best interests of the child.”).
8. See Beverly Webster Ferreiro, Presumption of Joint Custody: A Family Policy
Dilemma, 39 FAM. REL. 420, 420 (1990) (noting that the issue of joint custody is “hotly
debated between fathers’ and mothers’ rights groups and among mental health and
legal professionals” and “arouses passionate feelings on both sides”).
9. For the purposes of this Note, children born during lawful marriage will also be
referred to as “marital” children.
10. U.S. Census Bureau, Living Arrangements of Children Under 18 Years/1 and
Marital Status of Parents, by Age, Sex, Race, and Hispanic Origin/2 and Selected Char
acteristics of the Child for All Children: 2007, available at http://www.census.gov/
population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2007/tabC3-all.xls (last visited June 14, 2010).
11. For the purposes of this Note, children born out of wedlock will also be re
ferred to as “nonmarital” children.
12. See U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 10.

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE307.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 3

12-JUL-10

CUSTODY PRESUMPTIONS FOR UNMARRIED PARENTS

8:36

601

to constitutional challenge. Second, this Note questions if these
statutes reflect sound policy decisions by evaluating the benefits of
joint custody arrangements. Third, this Note focuses on the Massa
chusetts custody statute to determine if it can be more narrowly
crafted to protect the interests of willing and involved unwed fa
thers, especially those similarly situated to their child’s unwed
mother. This Note ultimately argues that the Massachusetts stat
utes should be amended to ensure equal treatment of unmarried
fathers in custody disputes.
Parts I and II of this Note take a parallel approach to the his
tory of custodial determinations for children, first looking at chil
dren born from marriage, then looking at children born out of
wedlock. Part III examines the Supreme Court jurisprudence on
unmarried fathers. Part IV summarizes the current standards in
custody awards, and Part V reviews the custody statutes across the
fifty states, with an initial focus on Massachusetts. Part VI then
asks the three questions developed above. This Note concludes
with a call to revise the Massachusetts statute so that unmarried
fathers and their children may receive equal treatment under the
law and unmarried fathers may become more involved with their
children’s upbringing.
I. CUSTODY

OF

MARITAL CHILDREN

In ancient Rome, the father maintained ultimate authority
over his child.13 Roman law provided the father with complete con
trol over the life of his child under the premise that he was respon
sible for the child’s existence.14 The law treated the father as the
child’s natural guardian; even upon the father’s death, the child’s
mother could not become the legal guardian.15 At base, the father’s
right to custody was treated as a property right.16 Eventually, Ro
13. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452.
14. See id. (“The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and death
over his children; upon this principle, that he who gave had also the power of taking
away.”). In contrast, a mother was subject to punishment for killing her child. See
Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L.
423, 425 (1976-77).
15. See Roth, supra note 14, at 426-27 (“[The mother] was not in the eye of that
law their natural guardian, even where the father died intestate, leaving them under
age; nor could he legally appoint her their guardian by will.” (quoting W. FORSYTH, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS IN CASES OF DIFFER
ENCE BETWEEN PARENTS OR GUARDIANS 9 (1850)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
16. See Weston, supra note 4, at 686. This authority also existed under ancient
Persian, Egyptian, Greek, and Gaulish law. Roth, supra note 14, at 425.
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man Emperor Constantine passed a law that banned infanticide, af
fecting a limit on this absolute authority and representing the state’s
first action on behalf of the minor child.17 Although this repre
sented a significant first step away from almost limitless paternal
power, it would be a very long time until mothers began to attain
parental rights approaching those of the father.
Under English common law, the father still maintained far su
perior rights over his children in comparison to the mother.18
Blackstone commented that while the father was entitled to disci
pline his child and receive the profits from his minor child’s labor,
the “mother . . . [was] entitled to no power, but only to reverence
and respect.”19 The rationale for this continued authority was often
based on the father’s financial obligations to his offspring as well as
the notion that the husband was the decision maker and protector
of the family.20 Some argued that this right was simply a law of
nature.21
In the rare custody dispute, early English law presumed that
the father had the right to custody over his minor children.22 This
right could, however, be displaced by a court of equity to protect
the child from an abusive23 or unfit father.24 American courts were
more likely to exercise discretion when making custody awards but
recognized “some sort of a prima facie right in the father.”25 De
spite this alleged right, the Supreme Court of Indiana once stated
17. See Roth, supra note 14, at 425; Weston, supra note 4, at 686 n.18.
18. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *452-53.
19. Id. at *453.
20. See Roth, supra note 14, at 427; Cynthia A. McNeely, Lagging Behind the
Times: Parenthood, Custody, and Gender Bias in the Family Court, 25 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 891, 896-97 (1998).
21. See Baird v. Baird, 21 N.J. Eq. 384, 393 (1869) (“The laws of nature and soci
ety concur in giving to the father the custody of his minor children . . . [T]hat the
authority of the father is superior to that of the mother . . . is the doctrine of all civilized
nations.”) (Dalrimple, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also WAR
SHAK, supra note 2, at 28; Roth, supra note 14, at 427-28.
22. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 19.1, at 787 (2d ed. 1988).
23. See Roth, supra note 14, at 428.
24. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 1467; see also CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.4, at 799
(“At common law the father . . . could be deprived of custody only where danger to the
child or corruption of the father were proved.”).
25. CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.1, at 787; see Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 259, 263
(1867) (“That the father is entitled to the custody and control of his minor children,
even to the exclusion of the mother, is elementary law.”); Henson v. Walts, 40 Ind. 170,
172 (1872) (“The father of a minor child, unless good reason to the contrary be shown,
is entitled to its custody.”).
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that a child could be removed from his father’s custody as long as
the reasons for doing so were “strong and cogent.”26
In the early nineteenth century, this paternal presumption be
gan to weaken.27 England enacted The Custody of Infants Act of
1839,28 which instructed courts to award custody of children under
seven to their mothers.29 This presumptive custodial award became
known as the “tender years doctrine.”30 By the early twentieth cen
tury in the United States, the tender-years presumption had
evolved into a firmly rooted belief that mothers were the parent

26. Henson, 40 Ind. at 172. The court did not fail to highlight, however, that a
father’s right to custody was “in consonance with the law of nature and the dictates of
common humanity.” Id.
27. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 1467. The oft-cited example of this change is the
case of Percy Bysshe Shelly, the English poet who sought custody of his children after
their mother committed suicide. Shelly v. Westbrooke, (1817) 37 Eng Rep. 850, 850
(Ch.); Eugene Volokh, Parent-Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 633 & n.1 (2006). Shelley was an atheist who “blasphemously
derided the truth of the Christian revelation” and unlawfully lived with a woman who
was not his wife. Shelley, 37 Eng. Rep. at 850. The Lord Chancellor stated that Shel
ley’s behavior was “immoral and vicious” and ultimately denied Shelley custody of his
children. Id. at 851-52. This shift away from a strict paternal presumption was also
observed around the same time in the United States. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 1468
(noting that “[f]urther cracks began to open in the paternal preference in cases of di
vorce as early as the 1810s and 1820s”); Volokh, supra, at 633.
28. Also referred to as the Talfourd Act of 1839, McNeely, supra note 20, at 897,
or Lord Talfourd’s Act, Weston, supra note 4, at 688. Serjeant Talfourd was responsible
for moving this bill through Parliament. Sanford N. Katz, “That They Might Thrive”
Goal of Child Custody: Reflections on the Apparent Erosion of the Tender Years Pre
sumption and the Emergence of the Primary Caretaker Presumption, 8 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 123, 126 (1992).
29. An Act to Amend the Law Relating to the Custody of Infants, 1839, 2 & 3
Vict. Stat., c. 54 (Eng.), cited in Katz, supra note 28, at 127 n.11. Prior to the passage of
this act, Mrs. Caroline Norton, a prominent member of the London high society, wrote
and published several pamphlets about the plight of women unable to see or communi
cate with their children postdivorce. Id. at 126. Two of her most notable pamphlets
were published in 1837. Id.
30. CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.1, at 787. As the presumption in favor of the
father was arguably based on a right earned through his obligation to care for and
support his child, the tender-years shift was considered to spring from the mother’s duty
and obligation to nurture and care for her child. See Mary Kate Kearney, The New
Paradigm in Custody Law: Looking at Parents with a Loving Eye, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 543,
548-49 (1996). Although this presumption was intended to provide a benefit to young
children, the courts were unable to consistently define what, in fact, the “tender years”
were. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.4, at 799 (“The presumption would clearly apply
to a child under five years, might apply to one under ten years and perhaps in a very
few cases might even apply to a child of eleven or twelve.”); see also Kendall v. Kendall,
687 N.E.2d 1228, 1235 (Mass. 1997) (noting the trial judge’s observation that “children
of tender years . . . likely means at least up to age 12” (emphasis added)).
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best suited for permanent child custody awards.31 In addition, the
onset of the Industrial Revolution and the migration of the husband
from the field to the factory further diminished his role from one of
caregiver to one of provider.32 Working in tangent, these cultural
and legal exclusions served to solidify the mother as the primary
custodian, the domestic partner, and the child’s nurturing parent.33
Although appealing to traditional family-role constructs, the
legal prevalence of the tender-years doctrine did not last.34 In the
1970s, as mothers began to leave their homes to join the workforce,
the automatic maternal-custody award lost some of its allure and
became less practical.35 Most states have now abandoned the ex
plicit application of this doctrine36 in favor of the best interests of
the child standard,37 likely as a result of both cultural38 and consti
31. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.1, at 787; WARSHAK, supra note 2, at 30;
Roth, supra note 14, at 428, 432-38; see, e.g., Jenkins v. Jenkins, 181 N.W. 826, 827 (Wis.
1921) (“[The mother] alone has the patience and sympathy required to mold and soothe
the infant mind in its adjustment to its environment. The difference between father
hood and motherhood in this respect is fundamental . . . .”); Duncan v. Duncan, 80 So.
697, 703 (Miss. 1919) (Holden, J. dissenting) (“The natural mother love of a mother for
her child is such, in my opinion, that no other person on earth can administer to the
care and welfare of her child the same as she can and would.”); Freeland v. Freeland,
159 P. 698, 699 (Wash. 1916) (“Mother love is a dominant trait in even the weakest of
women, and as a general thing surpasses the paternal affection for the common off
spring, and, moreover, a child needs a mother’s care even more than a father’s.”). In
fact, up until the latter half of the twentieth century, most state courts had at some point
awarded custody to the mother based on this maternal presumption, at times even in
the face of a statutory bar. See Roth, supra note 14, at 432 n.38.
32. McNeely, supra note 20, at 898.
33. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings
in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 391 (2009);
McNeely, supra note 20, at 898 (discussing the cultural pressure on mothers “to put
children first”).
34. See Linda Henry Elrod, Child Custody and Visitation, in FAMILY LAW &
PRACTICE § 32.06(5)(a) (Arnold H. Rutkin ed., 2008).
35. See id. § 32.06(5)(a) (noting that courts began to view the tender years pre
sumption as “unrealistic”).
36. Wyoming case law illustrates the historical progression of the tender-years
doctrine. In chronological order, see Nugent v. Powell, 33 P. 23, 27 (Wyo. 1893) (“[A]ll
things being equal, the father has a better right to the custody and services of his child
than has the mother, because the law primarily imposes upon the father the duty of
maintenance and nurture.”); In re Kosmicki, 468 P.2d 818, 823 (Wyo. 1970) (“[I]n pro
ceedings involving children of tender years it is only in very exceptional circumstances
that a mother should be deprived of the care and custody of her children.”); Fanning v.
Fanning, 717 P.2d 346, 348 (Wyo. 1986) (“Any remaining semblance of a maternalpreference rule was expressly eliminated from Wyoming law.”).
37. See Elrod, supra note 34, § 32.06(5)(a).
38. Id. Recently, the most traditional notions of family and parenthood have
evolved and changed, requiring the law to change with it. See Cynthia C. Siebel, Fa
thers and Their Children: Legal and Psychological Issues of Joint Custody, 40 FAM. L.Q.
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tutional considerations.39 The reality, however, is that, even with
the change of legal standard, the preference for maternal-custody
awards has not been eliminated.40 The legal community continues
to be influenced by gender stereotypes and traditional notions of
motherhood and fatherhood.41 Privately, judges have reported
their preference for the tender-years doctrine42 and have continued
to award custody to mothers in great disproportion to fathers.43
Working against this continued yet diminished existence of a
maternal-custody preference has been the emergence of joint cus
213, 218 (2006). The increase in unmarried childbearing, same-sex marriages, and alter
native reproductive technologies demands this continued evolution. See id. at 218-19.
39. Elrod, supra note 34, § 32.06(5)(a); see also CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.4, at
800 & n.22 (noting that such presumptions have been found to violate both state and
federal equal protection provisions).
40. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.4, at 800 (stating that “the custody of young
children continues to be awarded to their mothers in the majority of cases”); WAR
SHAK, supra note 2, at 32 (“The legacy of the tender-years presumption has continued
to influence custody decisions, so that the best-interest standard, despite its literal
meaning, has come to be interpreted primarily as a justification for the mother’s prefer
ential claim in custody disputes.”); Weston, supra note 4, at 690 (“Even though today,
the [maternal] preference rule and its alter ego, the tender years doctrine, have been
largely abolished, the abolition of the emotional dedication of judges to its application
has not been as easily eradicated.”).
41. See WARSHAK, supra note 2, at 33.
42. Julie E. Artis, Judging the Best Interests of the Child: Judges’ Accounts of the
Tender Years Doctrine, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 769, 769-71 (2004). In a study of twentyfive Indiana trial court judges, Professor Artis found that over half endorsed the tenderyears doctrine at some point during the study. Id. at 771; see also Leighton E. Stamps,
Age Differences Among Judges Regarding Maternal Preference in Child Custody Deci
sions, CT. REV., Winter 2000, at 20-21 (finding that over 42% of judges surveyed in
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee agreed that mothers were the pre
ferred custodian for children six years or younger). Another study examining the opin
ions of over 700 judges in Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and Washington found that about
half responded “Always or Usually” or “Sometimes” to some variation of the question,
“Are custody awards made based on the presumption that young children belong with
their mothers?” Douglas Dotterweich & Michael McKinney, National Attitudes Re
garding Gender Bias in Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 208,
215, 218-19 (2000). Similarly, only about 45% of the judges surveyed indicated that
fathers were “Always or Usually” treated fairly by the courts. Id. at 215. The authors
noted that this sample of respondents was “deemed to be nationally representative.”
Id. at 208; see also McNeely, supra note 20, at 918 n.155. Trial judges sometimes overtly
apply the tender-years doctrine in spite of legislation and common law to the contrary.
See, e.g., Visikides v. Derr, 348 S.E.2d 40, 42 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (reversing trial judge’s
application of the “tender years inference,” stating that its use was contrary to legisla
tion and common law and therefore reversible error).
43. See Meyer, supra note 2, at 1468-69 (noting that “gender bias . . . was largely
pushed underground” and that mothers still lead single-parent households by a large
margin); McNeely, supra note 20, at 918-20, 942 n.281, 942-43 (discussing studies from
different jurisdictions that found that gender bias was still prevalent in the courts).
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tody awards, which gained recognition in the 1970s.44 Joint custody,
at its core, promotes the continued contact and responsibility of
both parents in the life of their child.45 Many states have created
statutory presumptions in favor of joint custody, while others sim
ply permit joint custody awards.46 However, these presumptions
mostly find their homes in divorce statutes and are rarely available
for unmarried parents.47
II.

CUSTODY

OF

NONMARITAL CHILDREN

The distinction between the “legitimate child” and “the bas
tard,” drawn early in English law, was significant.48 A legitimate
child was defined as a child “born in lawful wedlock, or within a
competent time afterwards”;49 an illegitimate child, “one that is not
only begotten, but born, out of lawful matrimony.”50 Today, these
definitions remain largely in force.51
The modern presumptions of legitimacy derive from the once
strict English rule that a child born from a married mother was le
44. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.5, at 815. The first joint custody statute was
passed in North Carolina in 1957. Ferreiro, supra note 8, at 420. In 1979, five states had
enacted joint custody statutes, and by 1988, thirty-four states had passed similar legisla
tion. Id.
45. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.5, at 816. Joint custody proponents have argued that the continued contact between both parents and child helps reduce the loss a
child may experience when one parent leaves the household; shared responsibility also
serves to maintain important stabilizing psychological and emotional ties for both par
ent and child. Id.
46. Meyer, supra note 2, at 1471; see infra Part V.
47. See infra Part V.
48. CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.1, at 149. The law was unforgiving, burdening the
so-called “bastard child” with the sins of his parents:
The [illegitimate child’s] rights are very few, being only such as he can acquire;
for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son of nobody, and some
times called filius nullius [the son of no one] . . . Yet he may gain a surname by
reputation, though he has none by inheritance. All other children have their
primary settlement in their father’s parish; but a bastard in the parish where
born, for he hath no father. . . . [H]e cannot be heir to anyone, neither can he
have heirs, but of his own body; for, being nullius filius, he is therefore of kin
to nobody, and he has no ancestor from whom any inheritable blood can be
derived.
I BLACKSTONE, supra note 13, at *459.
49. Id. at *446.
50. Id. at *454.
51. CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.1, at 151 (stating that “these. . . definitions still hold
in our law except so far as they have been altered by statutes providing various methods
of legitimating the illegitimate child or limiting the concept of illegitimacy”).
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gitimate: the son or daughter of both married parents.52 This pre
sumption was nearly impossible to overcome; almost no evidence
could be admitted to a jury to prove that a child born from a mar
riage was “illegitimate.”53 Exceptions existed only for lack of ac
cess and impotency.54 Though theoretically plausible, lack of access
required proof that the presumed father was “beyond the four
seas”55 from before conception until postbirth.56 It mattered not
that a husband was overseas for several years; if he showed up one
day prior to his child’s birth, he was the father and the child was
legitimate.57 In the eighteenth century, this English rule was re
laxed to admit relevant evidence and allow a jury to decide whether
the child was a “bastard.”58 However, the presumption of legiti
macy remained strong and could be overcome only through clear
52. Id. § 4.1, at 151-52; Megan S. Calvo, Note, Say Goodbye to Donna Reed: Rec
ognizing Stepmothers’ Rights, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 773, 781 (2008) (noting that
“the presumption of legitimacy [declared] that a child born into a marital family was a
biological child of that union”).
53. TAPPING REEVE, THE LAW OF HUSBAND & WIFE, OF PARENT & CHILD,
GUARDIAN & WARD, MASTER & SERVANT 338-39 (4th ed. 1888).
54. Id. at 338; CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.1, at 152; Calvo, supra note 52, at 781-83.
55. If the father was outside of England, he was considered to be “beyond the
four seas.” CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.1, at 152.
56. Judge Cardozo once explained the force the presumption carried:
Potent, indeed, the presumption is one of the strongest and most persuasive
known to the law, and yet subject to the sway of reason. Time was, the books
tell us, when its rank was even higher. If a husband, not physically incapable,
was within the four seas of England during the period of gestation, the court
would not listen to evidence casting doubt on his paternity. The presumption
in such circumstances was said to be conclusive.
In re Findlay, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (N.Y. 1930) (citations omitted). Outside of proof the
husband was “beyond the four seas,” “no other evidence was admissible; not even if it
could be proved that the husband had been confined in a dungeon for years before the
birth of the child, and had never seen any person but the jailer.” REEVE, supra note 53,
at 338-39. Some United States courts maintained a presumption close to the one that
existed in England for some time. See, e.g., Powell v. State, 95 N.E. 660, 661 (Ohio
1911) (“[T]he four seas doctrine] has practically been adopted in the United States with
the modification that if the child is born under such circumstances that render it impos
sible that the husband of its mother can be its father, then the child may be adjudged a
bastard.”), overruled by State ex rel. Walker v. Clark, 58 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio 1944); see
also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-25 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing
the traditional presumption of legitimacy in England and the United States).
57. REEVE, supra note 53, at 338. The law had created this incredibly strong presumption “[a]pparently out of a desire to make amends for its shabby treatment of
illegitimate children generally.” CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.4, at 191. Specific policy
reasons included the prevention of illegitimate children becoming wards of the state
and the promotion of the traditional family. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125.
58. REEVE, supra note 53, at 339 n.1; WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS 219-21 (3d ed. 1896); see also Wright v.
Hicks, 12 Ga. 155, 160 (1852) (citing Lord Raymond as the first, in 1732, to have the
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evidence supporting nonaccess or impossibility of paternity.59 By
the nineteenth century, courts in the United States had abandoned
the “four seas” doctrine as well yet required proof “beyond all rea
sonable doubt” that the child was born of the alleged father.60
The determination of a child’s legitimacy, in addition to the
obvious impact on the child, also bore its mark on the rights and
duties of the parents.61 In contrast to the historical right fathers
had to their children born from marriage, the care and support of a
child born out of wedlock was traditionally placed with a child’s
mother62 or the parish into which he was born.63 The unwed
mother consistently maintained custodial rights superior to those of
the unwed father.64 This presumption precluded the unwed father
from being heard in custody proceedings involving his child; he had
no standing and could not object, for example, to the unwed
mother’s action of placing the child up for adoption.65 Though
seemingly harsh, if not unconstitutional, in its abridgement of an
unwed father’s rights, the presumption of legitimacy was considered
to serve the best interests of the child.66
courage to overrule the “four seas” doctrine in Pendrell v. Pendrell, (1732) 93 Eng. Rep.
945 (K.B.)).
59. REEVE, supra note 53, at 339 n.1.
60. See, e.g., Cross v. Cross, 3 Paige Ch. 139, 3 N.Y. Ch. Ann. 89 (1832). In the
language of the court,
The ancient rule, that the husband must be presumed to be the father, if he
was within the four seas during any part of the usual period of gestation, has
long since exploded; and, as Justice Gross says, “on account of its absolute
nonsense.” But the modern rule, which is marked out by its good sense, is,
that to bastardize the issue of a married woman, it must be shown beyond all
reasonable doubt, that there was no such access as could have enabled the
husband to be the father of the child.
Id. (emphasis added).
61. See infra notes 62-66.
62. Weston, supra note 4, at 687.
63. GRAHAM DOUTHWAITE, UNMARRIED COUPLES AND THE LAW § 3.6, at 138
(1979).
64. See Wright v. Wright, 2 Mass. 109, 110 (1806) (“[T]o provide for [the] support
and education [of a nonmarital child], the mother has a right to the custody and control
of him, and is bound to maintain him, as his natural guardian.”); Robalina v. Armstrong, 15 Barb. 247, 248 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1852) (“The mother of a bastard child is
entitled to its custody . . . .”); Weston, supra note 4, at 688. However, until relatively
recently, the unwed mother was not afforded any right to financial support. See Katha
rine K. Baker, Bargaining or Biology? The History and Future of Paternity Law and
Parental Status, 14 CORNELL J L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 6 (2004). Some states did not impose
a support obligation on the unwed father until 1971. Id.
65. Weston, supra note 4, at 691.
66. Id. at 693-94. The protection of the traditional family unit (mother, father,
and child), and the stability and harmony of the household, were paramount concerns
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Through the second half of the twentieth century, however, the
Supreme Court finally began to recognize the constitutional rights
of unmarried parents and nonmarital children.67
III.

PROTECTING

THE

RIGHTS

OF

UNMARRIED FATHERS

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court clearly articulated that a parent has the fundamental right to
raise and educate his child.68 Significantly, in Prince v. Massachu
setts, the Court held that parents maintain highest priority when the
issue of care and custody is at stake.69 But it was not until 1972 that
the Court faced, and then upheld, an equal protection challenge
raised by an unmarried father contesting a state statute that drew
distinctions between unmarried fathers and all other parents.70
Over the course of the following decade, the Court upheld a fa
ther’s right to equal protection under the law when distinctions
were drawn between unmarried fathers and other classes of par
ents,71 and unmarried fathers and unmarried mothers.72 During the
same period, the Court qualified these protections by identifying
different classes of unmarried fathers: those that held just a biologi
cal link to the child and those that, in addition to being a biological
of the state. Id. at 694. They remain paramount concerns. See Michael H. v. Gerald
D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating the “integrity of the traditional
family unit” is a stronger interest than the unwed father’s relationship to his child).
67. See Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535
(1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). The Uniform Parentage Act and most
state statutes declare that nonmarital children’s rights are equal to those of children
born from marriage. Niccol Kording, Nature v. Nurture: Children Left Fatherless and
Family-less When Nature Prevails in Paternity Actions, 65 U. PITT. L. REV. 811, 821
(2004).
68. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“It is cardinal with us
that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary
function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply
nor hinder.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“[Liberty] denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to . . . bring up
children . . . .”).
69. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166.
70. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
71. Id. at 649 (“We conclude that, . . . by denying [the unmarried father] a hearing
and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the
State denied [him] the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
72. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he distinction in § 111 between unmarried
mothers and unmarried fathers, as illustrated by this case, does not bear a substantial
relation to the State’s interest in providing adoptive homes for its illegitimate
children.”).
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parent, demonstrated some degree of commitment or responsibility
to the child.73
The Supreme Court’s decision in Stanley v. Illinois was the first
of several cases that examined the constitutional rights of unmar
ried fathers.74 The Court ultimately struck down an Illinois statute
that denied unwed fathers a hearing on their fitness before state
intervention75 on both due process76 and equal protection
grounds.77 Framing the issue as whether “a presumption that dis
tinguishes and burdens all unwed fathers [was] constitutionally repugnant,”78 the Court held that the distinction drawn between
unmarried fathers and all other classes of parents was unconstitu
tional.79 This was the Court’s first declaration that unmarried fa
thers had constitutionally protected rights.80 In subsequent cases,
73. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246,
256 (1978).
74. The father in Stanley, never married to the mother of his children, lost cus
tody of his children to the State of Illinois without a hearing on his fitness and without a
showing of neglect. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 646, 658.
75. The statute in dispute allowed the state, upon the death of the mother, to take
custody of a child from an unwed father based on the presumption that the unwed
father was unfit to raise his child. Id. at 646-47. The unwed father was not entitled to a
hearing on his fitness prior to the State’s assumption of custody of the children. Id.
76. Id. at 658. The Court acknowledged that the State’s interests of protecting
the psychological and physical welfare of the child, the best interests of the community,
and the child’s family bonds were legitimate. Id. at 652. The statutory means, however,
were not drawn tightly enough; separating a potentially fit parent from his child was
found to be contrary to the State’s goals. Id. at 652-53. The Court went on to reject the
State’s argument that even though some fathers may be fit to raise their children, be
cause “most unmarried fathers [were] unsuitable and neglectful parents,” all unmarried
fathers should be considered unfit. Id. at 654. Conceding that the administrative ease
of such a presumption warranted consideration, the Court stated that “the Constitution
recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency.” Id. at 656. The convenience of
“presuming rather than proving [a father’s] unfitness” was an advantage insufficient to
justify the denial of a father’s fundamental right to raise his child. Id. at 658.
77. Id. at 649. The Illinois dependency statute sought to treat unmarried fathers
differently from all other parents. Id. at 649-50. On the one hand, married mothers and
fathers and unmarried mothers would not lose their children to the state without “no
tice, hearing, and proof of such unfitness as a parent as amounts to neglect.” Id. at 650.
On the other hand, an unmarried father was not entitled to these neglect proceedings.
Id. The state instead employed a dependency proceeding, which did not require it to
“prove unfitness in fact, because it [was] presumed at law.” Id. The Court determined
“that all Illinois parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before
their children are removed from custody” and held “that denying such a hearing to
[unwed fathers] while granting it to other Illinois parents is inescapably contrary to the
Equal Protection Clause.” Id. at 658.
78. Id. at 649.
79. Id. at 658.
80. See id.
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the Court defined what actions were necessary to trigger these
rights.81
Several years later, the Court limited the constitutional protec
tion of the unmarried father’s rights by finding that an unmarried
father who had not “shouldered any significant responsibility” for
his child was not entitled to the same rights as a married father.82
In Quilloin v. Walcott, the Supreme Court rejected the father’s
equal protection claims,83 distinguishing him from the father in
Stanley, as well as married fathers, based on his failure to partici
pate in the “daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child.”84 In drawing the distinction between unmarried fathers, the
Court seemed to require that something more than a biological link
alone was necessary for a Stanley equal protection challenge to be
sustained.85
One year later, the Court further developed the claim for an
unwed father to successfully raise an equal protection challenge.86
In Caban v. Mohammed, the Court found that a statutory, gender
81. An unwed father’s rights to his child gain protection when he “demonstrates a
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood,” Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 261 (1983), “come[s] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,” Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392 (1979), or “shoulder[s] any significant responsibility with
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the child,” Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
82. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 256. The issue in Quilloin was whether Georgia’s adop
tion statute, which denied the appellant-father any veto right over the adoption of his
child, was unconstitutionally applied. Id. at 246. The challenge was raised by the father
of a child born out of wedlock when the child’s stepfather filed a petition for adoption
that was granted over the biological father’s objections. Id. at 247. At no point in the
eleven years from the child’s birth to the stepfather’s initial petition for adoption did
the father in Quilloin attempt to initiate a legitimization proceeding. Id. at 249. Geor
gia law allowed an unwed father to acquire veto authority only after he legitimized his
child. Id. at 248-49. Although the father in Quilloin petitioned for legitimization and
visitation at the time he contested the adoption, the trial court denied both requests.
Id. at 251. The trial court based its decision on the general finding that the father’s
irregular relationship with his son was disruptive and that therefore legitimization or
visitation would not be in the child’s best interests. Id.
83. Id. at 256.
84. See id. The Georgia Supreme Court also noted that the father “had never
been a de facto member of the child’s family unit.” Id. at 253.
85. See id. at 256. When there is a “difference in the extent of commitment to the
welfare of the child,” the parties should not be considered similarly situated. See id.
The Court also rejected the father’s due process challenge. Id. at 255. Again distin
guishing this case from Stanley, the Court held that because the proposed adoption
would not be breaking up an established family unit, but rather would secure one al
ready in existence, the best interests of the child were being served. Id. The application
of this standard under these circumstances did not violate the father’s fundamental lib
erties. Id. at 254.
86. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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based distinction drawn between the unmarried mother and unmar
ried father was unconstitutional when the father had a substantial
relationship with his child and had acknowledged his paternity.87
The Court reiterated the importance “of the relationship that in
fact exists between the parent and child”88 and conceded that an
unwed father who had not established such a relationship and had
not accepted the responsibilities of parenthood had no cause of ac
tion in the Equal Protection Clause.89
The Court reaffirmed this position in 1983, when it stated that
“the existence or nonexistence of a substantial relationship between
parent and child is a relevant criterion in evaluating both the rights
of the parents and the best interests of the child.”90 If the two un
married parents are not similarly situated with respect to their rela
tionship with their child, there is no remedy under the Equal
Protection Clause against a state which allocates a different set of
rights to each parent based on gender.91 Conversely, the Court
stated that when the relationship between the two unmarried par
ents and the child are in fact similar, the statutes in question could
87. Id. at 392. The unmarried parents in Caban lived together with their children
from 1969 through 1973. Id. at 382. When the mother left with the two children, they
were ages four and two, respectively. Id. The father was listed on their birth certifi
cates and contributed to their support while living with the mother. Id. The father
continued to see his children after they left with their mother. Id. In 1976, the mother
and her new husband filed a petition to adopt the two children, which was subsequently
granted, terminating the father’s parental rights. Id. at 383-84. Although the father had
clearly established a substantial relationship with his children, the New York Court of
Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the adoption statute that allowed unwed
mothers to block an adoption but did not afford unwed fathers the same authority. Id.
at 384-86. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Supreme Court found that the genderbased distinction was not substantially related to the State’s interest in providing adop
tive homes to children born out of wedlock. Id. at 391.
88. Id. at 393 n.14.
89. Id. at 392. The Court’s opinion suggests that an important first step in ac
cepting responsibility would be admitting paternity. See id. at 393 & n.15. The Court,
reversing the New York Court of Appeals on the gender-based equal protection chal
lenge, did not reach the appellant’s claim based on the distinction between married and
unmarried fathers or the appellant’s substantive due process claim. Id. at 394 n.16.
90. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983). Lehr presented another con
stitutional challenge to a New York adoption statute, brought by the unwed father of a
two-year-old child. Id. at 249-50. The father’s challenge was based on his lack of notice
of the adoption proceedings. Id. at 250. The Court found that because the father in
Lehr did not take responsibility for nor developed a substantial relationship with his
daughter, “the Federal Constitution [would] not automatically compel a state to listen
to his opinion of where the child’s best interests lie.” Id. at 262. The interest at issue
here, in the absence of a substantial parent-child relationship, was simply the opportu
nity interest of forming such a relationship. Id. at 262-63. The Court held that as a
matter of due process, the father’s opportunity interest was protected. Id. at 265.
91. Id. at 267-68.
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not be constitutionally applied.92 Stressing the need for some de
gree of relationship, the Court stated that “the mere existence of a
biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional
protection.”93
This line of cases established the constitutional rights of un
married fathers but did not grant them absolute rights.94 Subse
quent Supreme Court cases have continued to define the contours
of the unmarried father and the rights to which he—and his child—
are entitled.95 None, however, have examined the constitutionality
of presumptive custody awards that distinguish between unwed
mothers and fathers or between married and unmarried fathers.
IV. CUSTODY DEFINED
Custody is the general term that identifies the legal and physi
cal relationship that exists between the child and his parents.96 Cus
tody, in the context of a domestic-relations dispute, also carries with
92. Id. at 267.
93. Id. at 261. One commentator has described the difference in fathers as “the
reluctant father” versus “the father who grasps the opportunity biology gives him and
develops a relationship with his child.” Laura Oren, The Paradox of Unmarried Fathers
and the Constitution: Biology ‘Plus’ Defines Relationships; Biology Alone Safeguards the
Public Fisc, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 47, 61 (2004). The requirements of the
latter father are referred to as “biology plus.” Id. at 48. This language is useful short
hand for categorizing what the Supreme Court has come to require from an unwed
father who is seeking to protect his right to care and custody of his child. See id. at 47
48.
94. The rule from these cases, however, is far from clear. See ERWIN CHEMERIN
SKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 10.2.2, at 803 (3d ed. 2006)
(“The cases in this area are often difficult to reconcile.”); CLARK, supra note 22, § 20.2,
at 860 (“It is difficult if not impossible to arrive at an accurate or useful assessment of
the Supreme Court’s decisions from Stanley to Lehr.”).
95. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 62-70 (2001) (recognizing that an unwed bio
logical mother and an unwed biological father are not similarly situated with respect to
the biological verification of parentage, nor the opportunity to develop a parent-child
bond); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 129-130 (1989) (plurality opinion) (hold
ing that a putative father did not have standing to bring a paternity suit when the child
was born from a mother married to another man and affording substantial weight to
protecting the existing family unit). The Supreme Court has also defined the constitu
tional rights of children born out of wedlock, repeatedly holding that discrimination
against illegitimate children is unconstitutional. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
766 n.11 (1977) (citing cases). The Court has been clear that children born out of wed
lock cannot be subject to constitutionally invalid discrimination that is intended to deter
the parents from some wrongdoing. Id. at 769-70. The Court has stated that “imposing
disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to the individual responsibility or wrong
doing.” Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
96. CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.2, at 789.
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it the potential for a court-ordered childrearing arrangement that
will inevitably define the contours of a child’s relationship with both
of his parents.97 Judges and lawyers recognize this great responsi
bility they shoulder when faced with a custody dispute but, due to
the fact-specific nature of these cases, are little helped by statutes
and common law.98 Every state in the nation has adopted a custody
statute intended to assist lawyers and judges in making consistent
and predictable decisions in custody cases.99 The uniform standard
for awarding custody across jurisdictions is the “best interests of the
child” standard.100
In drafting their statutes, many states have explicitly distin
guished custody labels identifying both the legal relationship be
tween parents and child as well as the residential and parenting
arrangement each parent will have with the child.101 Massachusetts
is one such state.102 Other states tend to group the legal and physi
cal relationship into the broad custody label, especially when ad
dressing joint custody.103 In general, however, the terminology
tends to be uniform: “legal custody” encompasses the decisionmaking responsibility of the parent or parents, and “physical cus
tody” defines the living arrangement and parenting schedule be
tween parent and child.104 The Massachusetts statutory definitions,
found in the divorce statute, are no exception.105
97. See id. § 19.1, at 787.
98. Id.
99. See Elrod, supra note 34, § 32.06(1) n.2.
100. Id. § 32.06(1). See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (West 2004); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(b) (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(3) (Supp.
2009); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(a) (2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(a)
(2002); Webb v. Knudson, 582 A.2d 282, 287 (N.H. 1990); Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582
A.2d 909, 913-14 (R.I. 1990).
101. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 3006, 3007 (defining sole legal and sole physi
cal custody); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (5) (West 2007) (defining physical and legal
custody).
102. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (defining sole and shared legal and physical
custody).
103. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a (a) (including joint decisionmaking and shared physical custody in the joint custody award). The Connecticut stat
ute, however, does allow the court to “award joint legal custody without awarding joint
physical custody.” Id.
104. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.2, at 790.
105. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31. The Massachusetts definitions are as
follows:
“Sole legal custody”, one parent shall have the right and responsibility to
make major decisions regarding the child’s welfare including matters of educa
tion, medical care and emotional, moral and religious development.
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Rising out of a desire from both parents to be decision makers
(i.e., legal custodians) and residential parents, custody disputes
have become commonplace in divorce proceedings as well as in liti
gation between unmarried parents.106 Mothers and fathers are peti
tioning for one or more of the various forms of custody, and courts
are now awarding joint legal and physical custody more frequently
than before.107 Although traditional sole custody awards remain
dominant, parents, and especially fathers, are fighting for greater
parental responsibilities and parenting time with their children.108
For the unmarried father, a recognition is growing that once he
has acknowledged paternity or been judicially adjudicated the fa
ther, he obtains parental rights similar to those of the unwed
mother.109 The challenges that courts face, however, involve apply
ing relatively clear-cut statutory definitions of custody to the in
“Shared legal custody”, continued mutual responsibility and involvement
by both parents in major decisions regarding the child’s welfare . . .
“Sole physical custody”, a child shall reside with and be under the super
vision of one parent, subject to reasonable visitation by the other parent, un
less the court determines that such visitation would not be in the best interest
of the child.
“Shared physical custody”, a child shall have periods of residing with and
being under the supervision of each parent; provided, however, that physical
custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure a child fre
quent and continued contact with both parents.
Id. In defining and awarding shared legal custody, Massachusetts makes it clear that
both parents may have the right and responsibility to be involved in any major decision
involving the child’s upbringing. Id. These decisions include public versus private edu
cation, conventional versus alternative medical care, and the choice of religious teach
ings—if any. See id. However, Massachusetts also recognizes that the award of sole
legal custody can also be appropriate when in the best interest of the child. See id.
106. See William I. Weston, Child Custody and Visitation Issues in Cases Involving
Disputed Paternity, in DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS, §32.05(1)(a) (Carl W. Gil
more ed., 2009).
107. See id. (noting the “rapid acceptance of the concept of joint custody”).
108. See id. Nonmarital fathers, in particular, have been seeking out their paren
tal rights once they have legally established parentage. See id.
109. See id. This recognition is not without a historical foundation. In both of the
previously discussed adoption cases where the Supreme Court rejected the father’s con
stitutional challenge, the relevant statutes would have granted the father the rights he
was seeking had he legally recognized his fatherhood. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
248, 250-51 (1983) (registration in the New York putative father registry would have
demonstrated the father’s intent to claim paternity and therefore would have entitled
him to notice of the pending adoption); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 248-49 (1978)
(legitimization proceeding would have given unwed father the veto authority other par
ents enjoyed); see also Richard P. Perna, Rights of Putative Fathers to Custody and
Visitation, in CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION § 30.03 (Sandra Morgan Little ed.,
2009) (discussing the progressive dismissal of the maternal preference rule in putative
father custody disputes).

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE307.txt

616

unknown

Seq: 18

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

12-JUL-10

8:36

[Vol. 32:599

creasingly complex scenarios involving the parents of children born
out of wedlock.110 Further complicating the process are statutory
presumptions in favor of one form of custody over another.111 The
following section examines the various ways in which state statutes
and common law have addressed the issue.
V. STATE STATUTORY SCHEMES
Each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia has, at a
minimum, a custody statute that provides the state courts a mecha
nism for awarding custody to one or both biological parents during
divorce or separation proceedings. The vast majority of these stat
utes address the possibility of some variety of joint custody, includ
ing shared custody,112 joint legal custody,113 joint decision-making
responsibilities,114 and others. These statutes reflect a full spectrum
of legislative opinions on whether joint custody,115 in any form, is a
preferred outcome for separating parents. The subsections below
discuss the general categories that each statutory scheme may fall
in, with a focus on how these statutes affect unwed fathers.
The five general categories of state statutes are as follows: (1)
joint custody presumption or preference for both divorcing and un
wed parents;116 (2) no joint custody presumption or preference in
divorcing parents or unwed parents;117 (3) joint custody presump
tion or preference in divorcing parents only;118 (4) no joint custody
presumption or preference but maternal sole custody presumption
for unwed mothers;119 and (5) joint custody presumption or prefer
ence in divorcing parents only and maternal sole custody presump
110. See Weston, supra note 106, § 32.05(1)(b).
111. See id. The greatest difficulties tend to arise when a married woman gives
birth to a child whose father is not the mother’s husband. Id. “This situation creates a
no-win situation for a putative father by establishing a custody battle triangle between
the mother, her husband . . . and the putative father.” Id.; see, e.g., Michael H. v.
Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113-117 (1989) (plurality opinion).
112. See, e.g., 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304 (West 2001).
113. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 807 A.2d 1211, 1213 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2002).
114. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-207(b) (LexisNexis 2009).
115. In this Part, joint custody is intended to include any of the following: joint
legal custody, joint physical custody, or both joint legal and physical custody.
116. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 461-A:5, 461-A:3(II) (Supp. 2009).
117. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b) (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(A) (Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2003); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 665(a) (2002).
118. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.465 (LexisNexis 2004).
119. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.03 (West 2005).
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tion for unwed mothers.120 In each of the five following
subsections, these categories are labeled and described in depth.121
The joint custody laws of all fifty states and the District of Colum
bia are reviewed in greater depth in the Appendix.
A. Marital-Status-Equality States—With Joint Custody
Presumptions or Preferences
States in this category treat both married and unmarried par
ents equally by providing for a presumption of or preference for
some type of joint custody for all married and unmarried parents.
Unwed fathers looking for joint custody in these states are in the
best position. First, they have no gender-based presumption to
overcome. Second, unless there is a finding that the father is unfit,
abusive, or for some other reason would not be a suitable parent to
the child, the court considers that joint custody is in the best inter
ests of the child. However, states in this category are in the
minority.122
New Hampshire, for example, explicitly declares that its policy
is to “[s]upport frequent and continuing contact between each child
and both parents.”123 The legislative scheme provides for a pre
sumption “that joint decision-making responsibility is in the best
interest of minor children.”124 For unwed parents petitioning for
parental rights and responsibilities, the statute provides that the
same provisions applicable to divorcing parents also apply to un
married parents.125
120. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2008); id. ch. 209C, § 10(a).
121. The category labels focus on the differences between mothers and fathers
(gender-based distinctions) and between married and unmarried parents (marital-class
distinctions).
122. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(c) (2008); D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(2)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2010); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 32-717B(4) (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (2005); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 132 (1999); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp. 2010); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:5 (Supp. 2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.131(b) (Vernon
2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-207(b) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 767.41(2)(am) (West 2009); see also infra Appendix.
123. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:2.
124. Id. § 461-A:5; see also In re Mannion, 917 A.2d 1272, 1275 (N.H. 2007)
(“When devising a parenting plan relating to decision-making responsibility . . . , there
is a presumption that joint decision-making responsibility is in the best interest of the
child unless there has been a finding of abuse.”).
125. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:3.
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B. Marital-Status-Equality States—Without Joint Custody
Presumptions or Preferences
States in this category also treat married and unmarried par
ents equally by avoiding joint custody presumptions or preferences
for any class of parent. An unwed father in this category carries the
same burden that the divorcing father carries if he (the unwed fa
ther) seeks a joint custody arrangement, but he does not face an
overt gender-based presumption.126 Depending on the criteria, a
putative father may successfully petition for joint custody at the be
ginning of litigation.127 Petitioners in Connecticut, for example,
may be awarded joint custody, which provides for joint decision
making and shared physical custody.128 However, there is no pre
sumption in favor of joint custody in contested disputes.129 In Con
necticut, these provisions apply to “all cases in which the parents of
a minor child live separately.”130
These states, and states that create joint custody presumptions
or preferences for all separating parents, treat married and unmar
126. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-152 (LexisNexis 1998); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25.403.01(A) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040(b) (West 2004); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-10-124 (West Supp. 2009); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(a) (West 2009);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a) (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(1) (Supp. 2009);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46.1(a) (LexisNexis 2009); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
602(c) (West Supp. 2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 2010); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (LexisNexis Supp. 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653
(Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203 (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2007); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 452.375 (West Supp. 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (2009); N.J. STAT.
ANN. 9:2-4 (West 2002); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2010); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-31 (Supp. 2010); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(C)(2) (West Supp. 2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(a)
(2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304 (West 2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2003);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3-530(A)(42) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(5) (Supp.
2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(a) (2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.184
(West Supp. 2010); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2009); see also infra Appendix.
127. Note that there are states that create a presumption in favor of joint custody
when the parents are in agreement. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3080 (“There is a pre
sumption . . . that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor child . . . where the
parents have agreed to joint custody . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b)
(“There shall be a presumption . . . that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor
child where the parents have agreed to an award of joint custody . . . of the minor child
or children of the marriage.”). Because this presumption does not exist when the par
ties are in disagreement, these states remain classified as disfavoring joint custody
presumptions.
128. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56.
129. Id.; see also supra note 127 and accompanying text.
130. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-61.
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ried couples the same. Yet, many other states apply presumptions
based on the marital status or gender of the parent.
C. Marital-Status-Distinction States
States in this category do not create any maternal presump
tions in any part of their statutory scheme. However, they do allow
for a presumption of some type of joint custody in divorcing par
ents but not unmarried parents.131 This distinction places the un
wed father at a disadvantage when compared to the custodial rights
of the divorcing father.
In these states, practically speaking, a divorcing father from a
marriage of any length is entitled to a presumption of joint cus
tody.132 However, if the father of a nonmarital child initiates a cus
tody proceeding—even if he has been in a long-term relationship
with the mother and has a substantial relationship with his child—
he will not be entitled to the same presumption.133
D. Marital-Status- and Gender-Based-Distinction States
States in this category do not create broad distinctions between
parents based on marital status because, as a rule, they do not favor
joint custody presumptions or preferences for any class.134 But, be
cause these states allow for a presumption of sole custody in the
unmarried mother, they maintain their status as class- and genderdiscriminatory states because, by virtue of this presumption, unwed
fathers have a greater burden for achieving joint custody than do
divorcing fathers. In other words, these states do not have a prefer
ence for joint custody, but they do create a presumption that the
unwed mother maintains sole custody of the nonmarital child. For
example, in Arkansas, there are no joint custody presumptions for
divorcing or unmarried parents.135 However, legal custody of a
child born out of wedlock is awarded to the mother; the father may
131. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.465 (LexisNexis 2004); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West 2003); see also infra Appendix.
132. E.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480(1)-(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005).
133. See id.; infra Appendix.
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i), 9-10-113(a) (2009); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-37-2-2.1 (West 2007); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-13 (West 2008); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 42-364 (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3109.03, 3109.042 (West 2005);
TENN. CODE ANN. 36-2-303 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (Supp.
2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Supp. 2009); see also infra Appendix.
135. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i).
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then petition the court for custody once he has established his
paternity.136
E. Elevated Marital-Status- and Gender-Based-Distinction States
States in this category create the greatest divide between un
married fathers and all other classes of parents (married parents
and unwed mothers).137 Unmarried fathers in these states find
themselves at the greatest disadvantage. Not only do they face the
burden imposed by the statutory gender-based distinction (that is,
the maternal sole-custody presumption), but these fathers are fur
ther separated from their divorcing counterparts because the di
vorcing father starts with a presumption of or preference for some
class of joint custody. Massachusetts’s custody laws provide an ex
ample of this scheme.
Massachusetts draws a clear distinction between divorcing par
ents and unmarried parents by providing for each class of parents in
two completely separate statutes;138 significantly, the two statutes
provide two different sets of custodial presumptions.139 While the
divorce statute contains a joint custody presumption, the paternity
statute contains a maternal sole custody presumption.140
The Massachusetts divorce statute explicitly awards temporary
shared legal custody to divorcing parents, upon commencement of
the divorce suit.141 This presumption is rebuttable: if the judge de
termines that joint legal custody is not in the best interests of the
136.
137.

Id. §§ 9-10-113(a) to -113(b).
See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2008); id. ch. 209C, § 10(a); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-7 (Supp. 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-10 (2004); see also
infra Appendix.
138. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208 (divorce statute); id. ch. 209C (children born
out of wedlock statute).
139. Id. ch. 208, § 31; id. ch. 209C, § 10.
140. Id. ch. 208, § 31; id. ch. 209C, § 10.
141. Id. ch. 208, § 31. The relevant portion of the statutory provision reads,
Upon the filing of an action in accordance with the provisions of this sec
tion, section twenty-eight of this chapter, or section thirty-two of chapter two
hundred and nine and until a judgment on the merits is rendered, absent
emergency conditions, abuse or neglect, the parents shall have temporary
shared legal custody of any minor child of the marriage; provided, however,
that the judge may enter an order for temporary sole legal custody for one
parent if written finding are made that such shared custody would not be in
the best interest of the child. Nothing herein shall be construed to create any
presumption of temporary shared physical custody.
Id. (emphases added). Although the statute removes any such presumption at the time
of trial, throughout the course of litigation, each parent maintains equal rights to par
ticipate in the major decisions of the child. Id.
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child, sole legal custody to one parent may be ordered.142 There is
no presumption, temporary or otherwise, of joint physical
custody.143
The Massachusetts paternity statute takes a different tack. In
sharp contrast to parents divorcing in Massachusetts, the paternity
statute provides for a presumption of sole custody144 in the mother
from the point of birth, through adjudication or acknowledgement
of paternity, and until any further judgment or order of the court.145
Even after a father has acknowledged his paternity, sole custody
remains exclusively with the mother.146 Although the father inter
ested in joint custody may overcome this presumption by petition
ing the court, the judge may only award joint custody if one of two
conditions are met.147 The court may award joint custody if the
parties enter into an agreement relative to such an award.148 Alter
natively, the court may grant joint custody if it finds that both par
ties had exercised joint responsibility for the child prior to litigation
and that the parties can effectively communicate regarding the

142. Id.; see, e.g., Rolde v. Rolde, 425 N.E.2d 388, 392 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)
(upholding sole legal (and physical) custody award to mother in a “divorce traumatized
by personal and emotional conflict”). But see Kendall v. Kendall, 687 N.E.2d 1228,
1236 (Mass. 1997) (upholding award of joint legal custody even though parties had
highly divergent religious views); Doe v. Doe, 452 N.E.2d 293, 295-96 (Mass. App. Ct.
1983) (holding that an award of joint legal (and physical) custody was not precluded by
the conflict between the parents when that conflict did not impact the child).
143. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31.
144. This statutory provision fails to distinguish between physical and legal cus
tody and is therefore presumed to award both to the mother. Id. ch. 209C, § 10(b).
145. Id. The relevant portion of the statutory provision reads,
Prior to or in the absence of an adjudication or voluntary acknowledge
ment of paternity, the mother shall have custody of a child born out of wed
lock. In the absence of an order or judgment of a probate and family court
relative to custody, the mother shall continue to have custody of a child after an
adjudication of paternity or voluntary acknowledgement of parentage.
Id. (emphasis added).
146. Id.
147. Id. § 10(a). The statutory language reads,
In awarding the parents joint custody, the court shall do so only if the
parents have entered into an agreement . . . or the court finds that the parents
have successfully exercised joint responsibility for the child prior to the com
mencement of proceedings . . . and have the ability to communicate and plan
with each other concerning the child’s best interests.
Id.
148. Id.
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child’s best interests.149 If the judge awards the parties joint cus
tody, the decision must be supported with written findings.150
Massachusetts can therefore be categorized as a state that dis
tinguishes between divorcing parents and unmarried parents by (a)
creating a presumption of joint legal custody in divorcing parents
and (b) creating a presumption of sole physical and sole legal cus
tody in the unmarried mother.
VI. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY

OF

CUSTODY STATUTES

For married couples, custodial preferences over the past sev
eral hundred years have shifted from the authoritative father to the
nurturing mother to somewhere in between. For unmarried par
ents, the biological differences between mother and father have
long favored the unwed mother as the de facto custodian of the
nonmarital child. The Supreme Court has sifted through this com
plicated history and clarified the rights of unmarried fathers but has
left many questions unanswered. While the states have attempted
to answer the parenting policy questions, the spectrum of solutions
reflects the ongoing debate over the roles separated fathers and
mothers must play in the rearing of their children. And despite leg
islatures’ best efforts, some of these statutory solutions unconstitu
tionally discriminate against unmarried fathers.
When a custody statute distinguishes all unmarried fathers
from any other class of parent—unmarried mothers and divorcing
mothers and fathers—that statute is susceptible to an equal protec
tion challenge under the federal constitution. Although such stat
utes may be difficult to overturn under an intermediate level of
federal scrutiny, the Massachusetts statute for children born out of
wedlock should be overturned when strict scrutiny is applied as re
quired by the Massachusetts Equal Rights Amendment.
149. Id. Because the statute does not distinguish between physical and legal cus
tody, see id., any request for joint legal custody would likely have to meet this standard.
See K.J.M. v. M.C., 624 N.E.2d 571, 571-72 (Mass. App. Ct. 1993) (applying require
ments of § 10(a) when judge granted an award of “‘joint custody with [the mother]
having the physical care’ of the child,” which implicitly limited the award to joint legal
custody (alteration in original) (quoting trial judge’s order)).
150. See K.J.M., 624 N.E.2d at 572 (reversing joint custody order when no find
ings supporting the order were made). See generally Carwina Weng & Dorothy M.
Gibson, Custody, Visitation, and Removal Issues Related to Children of Unmarried Par
ents, in I PATERNITY AND THE LAW OF PARENTAGE IN MASSACHUSETTS §§ 6.2.1-6.2.2
(Pauline Quirion ed., 2002) (discussing Massachusetts custody awards in the context of
a paternity suit).
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A. Custody Statutes and Constitutional Challenge
Authors have argued that joint custody is a fundamental con
stitutional right to which all parents are entitled unless there is a
genuine risk of harm to the child.151 Although many states have
created statutory presumptions favoring some form of joint cus
tody,152 the courts have not declared such an arrangement a consti
tutionally protected right.153 Some state statutes continue to
maintain a presumption that provides for a sole custody award to
the unmarried mother.154 Further, in several jurisdictions, divorc
ing fathers are granted a greater set of custodial rights over unmar
ried fathers.155
These statutory provisions raise the following three constitu
tional issues: (1) whether gender-based distinctions that provide for
a presumptive award of sole physical or legal custody to the unwed
mother survive equal protection scrutiny;156 (2) whether the classifi
cation of unwed fathers represents a constitutionally prohibited
overbroad generalization;157 and (3) whether unmarried fathers, as
compared to divorcing fathers, suffer from unconstitutional discrim
ination. The next three subsections address these questions and
conclude that (1) sweeping custody statutes that provide for mater
nal preferences for all nonmarital children violate equal protection;
(2) forcing all unwed fathers to overcome a greater burden to gain
151. See, e.g., Holly L. Robinson, Joint Custody: Constitutional Imperatives, 54 U.
CIN. L. REV. 27 (1985); James W. Bozzomo, Note, Joint Legal Custody: A Parent’s Con
stitutional Right in a Reorganized Family, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 547 (2002); Ellen Cana
cakos, Note, Joint Custody as a Fundamental Right, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 785 (1981).
152. See supra Part V.A, C, E.
153. E.g., Jacobs v. Jacobs, 507 A.2d 596, 599 (Me. 1986) (“There is . . . nothing in
the United States or the Maine Constitution that requires a divorce court to give a
preference to joint custody over other allocations of parental rights and responsibili
ties.”); see CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.5, at 815 n.2 (noting that “[t]he courts have not
gone this far”); Meyer, supra note 2, at 1477-79 (discussing unsuccessful constitutional
claims for equal custody); cf. Arnold v. Arnold, 679 N.W.2d 296, 299 (Wis. Ct. App.
2004) (concluding “that parents [do not] have a ‘fundamental right’ to ‘equal placement
periods’ after divorce”). Contemplating Professor Clark’s observation on “the ten
dency of some law review writers to expand constitutional doctrines to and beyond
their uttermost limits,” CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.5, at 815 n.2, this Note limits the
constitutional discussions to equal protection.
154. See supra Part V.D, E.
155. See supra Part V.C, E.
156. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating the requisite stan
dard of review: “To withstand constitutional challenge . . . classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve
ment of those objectives.”).
157. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 (1996).

R
R
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joint legal custody is both an overinclusive158 and underinclusive159
categorization; and (3) unmarried fathers that legally acknowledge
or adjudicate their paternity should be entitled to the same set of
custody rights as a divorcing father.
1. Custody Statutes and Gender Distinctions
a. The constitutional problem—gender discrimination
A statute that, by its very language, distinguishes between men
and women is a facially discriminatory statute160 and automatically
subject to heightened scrutiny under the United States Constitu
tion.161 A gender-based distinction will be upheld only when it is
substantially related to an important government interest.162 The
examination of the relationship between the gender classification
and the government interest will necessarily involve a determina
tion of whether the sexes are similarly situated.163 If the parties are
similarly situated, a court examines the effect of the classification,
the importance of the government interest, and whether the classifi
cation is substantially related to the government interest.164 If the
government fails to provide an “exceedingly persuasive justifica
tion” for the classification, the statute cannot withstand judicial re
view.165 This equal protection analysis applies where state action
overtly implicates gender classifications and would therefore gov
ern a challenge to a gender-based custody statute.
For a custody statute that creates a presumption of sole legal or
physical custody of the child in the unmarried mother,166 the gen
158. Such categorization is overinclusive because some unwed fathers may be
qualified to share legal custody and are de facto similarly situated to the unwed mother;
for example, the unwed couple that lived together for ten years and equally shared in
the physical, mental, and moral upbringing of their two children before separation.
159. Such categorization is underinclusive because some divorcing fathers may
have never experienced fatherhood or shared decision making for the child; for exam
ple, the father who left the mother during pregnancy after just a few months of
marriage.
160. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 94, § 9.4.2, at 757 (“[T]he gender classification can exist on the face of the law; that is, the law in its very terms draws a distinction
among people based on gender.”).
161. See Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393
(1979) (applying intermediate scrutiny to statute that distinguished between unmarried
mothers and unmarried fathers).
162. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 265-66 (1983).
163. Id. at 267-68.
164. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996).
165. See id. at 533.
166. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(b) (2008).

R

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE307.txt

2010]

unknown

Seq: 27

12-JUL-10

CUSTODY PRESUMPTIONS FOR UNMARRIED PARENTS

8:36

625

der-based distinction is apparent,167 and heightened scrutiny is war
ranted.168 To successfully challenge such a statute, the unmarried
father would need to establish that he is similarly situated to the
unmarried mother.169 In the context of unmarried parents and their
children, an important consideration is the presence or absence of a
substantial relationship between each parent and the child.170 If a
court finds that both parents have a substantial relationship with
the child,171 the government carries the burden of showing that the
statute is substantially related to the proposed government
interest.172
Although gender classifications warrant heightened levels of
judicial scrutiny, an unmarried father first needs to overcome the
argument that mothers and fathers are inherently different.173 In
deed, the Supreme Court has recognized that mothers and fathers,
167. Cf. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 386-88 (1979) (finding that the chal
lenged provision of a New York adoption statute, which gave unmarried mothers, but
not unmarried fathers, the right to block an adoption, drew its distinction based on sex);
Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 139 (Mass. 1980) (“Clearly, to differentiate be
tween an illegitimate child’s right to inherit it from his or her natural mother . . . and
that child’s right to inherit from his or her natural father . . . is to establish a classifica
tion based on sex.”).
168. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
169. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 267-68 (1983).
170. Id. at 266. The Lehr Court further articulated the significance of two biolog
ical parents with two entirely different parenting relationships with their child by stat
ing, “If one parent has an established custodial relationship with the child and the other
parent has . . . never established a relationship, the Equal Protection Clause does not
prevent a State from according the two parents different legal rights.” Id. at 267-68.
171. Or, theoretically, a court could find that neither parent has a substantial rela
tionship with the child.
172. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 393. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
examined a classification scheme that limited to males admission to a state military
institute. 518 U.S. 515, 520 (1996). In articulating the standard of review, the Court
stated that “[t]he burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.”
Id. at 533. The Court also required that the justification be “exceedingly persuasive.”
Id.; see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 74 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[A]
party who seeks to defend a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of sex ‘must
carry the burden of showing an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for the classifica
tion.’” (quoting Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1981))). Justice
O’Connor, in her dissent, describes at length the significantly higher standard of review
imposed on sex-based classifications. Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 75-78 (O’Connor, J., dissent
ing). In addition to reiterating the State’s heavy burden and the Court’s responsibility
to ensure the justification is exceedingly persuasive, she noted that the State’s justifica
tion must be sincere and cannot rely on overbroad generalizations, even when they
have empirical support. Id. at 74-76. Further, the government interest must be impor
tant, not simply legitimate. Id. at 77. Most importantly, the relationship between the
contested means and the government interest must be substantial. Id.
173. But cf. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (“Supposed ‘inherent differences’ are no
longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications.”).
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simply through the biology of birth, are not similarly situated.174
However, once a father has taken the timely initiative to legally
establish his paternity, that father has separated himself from the
passive, disinterested putative father and should be considered sim
ilarly situated to the unwed mother, at least with respect to legal
custody presumptions.175 This treatment should be given greater
weight when both parents have signed a voluntary acknowledge
ment of parentage.176
At first, placing unmarried fathers, specifically those who are
active and responsible but have yet to establish a meaningful rela
tionship with their children, on equal footing with unmarried
mothers may seem contrary to the Supreme Court’s “substantial re
lationship” language of Lehr 177 and Caban.178 But the absence of a
substantial relationship is not dispositive of an equal protection
claim in this context. In finding no “substantial relationship” be
tween the father and child, the Lehr Court limited its application to
a “relevant criterion.”179 In the contrary holding in Caban, the
Court determined that the presence of a substantial father-child re
lationship undermined the constitutionality of the challenged stat
ute but was not explicitly required.180 And in Quilloin, the Court’s
opinion suggests a different outcome181 had the putative father
made any effort to legitimate, seek custody of, or financially sup
174. See Nguyen, 533 U.S. at 62, 73 (“The difference between men and women in
relation to the birth process is a real one . . . .”); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261 (“[T]he mere
existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection.”).
175. See, e.g., In re Baby Girl Dockery, 495 S.E.2d 417, 420 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998)
(concluding that once putative father completed one of the actions specified by the
adoption statute, including acknowledgement of paternity, he could “establish his obli
gation of parental care and support, beyond the mere biological link to the child, and
become similarly situated to the mother”). But see In re Byrd, 421 N.E.2d 1284, 1286
(Ohio 1981) (holding “that legitimation is [not] a prerequisite for the natural father to
have equality of standing with the mother” in a custody proceeding, where mother’s
consent was required for all three methods of legitimation).
176. When both parents signal their mutual assent of parentage, the law should
recognize these indicia of both paternal responsibility and parental cooperation. Justice
White made the same observation twenty-five years ago: “Indeed, there would appear
to be more reason to [recognize the rights of unwed fathers] such as Lehr who acknowl
edge paternity than to those who have been adjudged to be a father in a contested
paternity action.” Lehr, 463 U.S. at 274 (White, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 266 (majority opinion).
178. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 393 (1979).
179. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266.
180. See Caban, 441 U.S. at 393-94.
181. The Court upheld the statute against the father’s challenge. Quilloin v.
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
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port his child.182 Because the Court in these cases addressed fa
thers that clearly did not have a substantial relationship with their
children, an unwed father who actively seeks involvement in his
child’s life and accepts responsibility for the care, custody, and sup
port of his child should be able to assert a valid equal protection
challenge as a parent similarly situated to the child’s mother.183 Es
tablishing paternity is an appropriate and accurate representation
of a putative father’s intention and desire to participate in his
child’s upbringing.184
b. The constitutional solution: recognizing acknowledged fathers
Because contested adoption185 and custody cases are highly
fact-driven, a statute that groups all unwed fathers together goes
too far. It is more appropriate to draw the line between the puta
tive father and the acknowledged father.186 It may be too optimis
tic to label all unwed fathers who have established their paternity as
deserving and responsible fathers. But recognizing the acknowl
182. See id. at 253, 255. In the context of the father’s due process challenge, the
Court stated, “But this is not a case in which the unwed father at any time had, or
sought, actual or legal custody of his child.” Id. at 255 (emphasis added). In reaching
its conclusion, the Court highlighted the putative father’s complete failure to exercise
“actual or legal custody over his child” and the absence of responsibility for the “daily
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child” in eleven years since the child’s
birth. Id. at 254, 256.
183. See David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional Dilemma of the
Faultless Father, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 762-63 (1999). Professor Meyer’s characteriza
tions are instructive:
[T]he Court’s cases seem to contemplate only two models of fatherhood: the
man of virtue who is integrally involved in the rearing of his children and the
scofflaw who has slept on his rights while others changed diapers and read
bedtime stories. The Court’s cases do not squarely resolve what should be
done with the father who falls somewhere in between these two poles—for
example, the man who has done everything he reasonably could to establish a
relationship with his child but who has been thwarted by circumstances be
yond his control.
Id. at 763 (footnote omitted).
184. See, e.g., Scheeler v. Rudy, 2 Pa. D. & C.3d 772, 775 (C.P. 1977) (“[W]here
an unwed father admits and asserts his paternity of the illegitimate child or children in
question, he shall have equal standing in the eyes of the law with the mother of such
children to be considered for custody of them.”); cf. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 101.024(a) (Vernon 2008) (including in the definition of “parent” a “man legally de
termined to be the father, a man who has been adjudicated to be the father by a court
of competent jurisdiction, [and] a man who has acknowledged his paternity under appli
cable law”).
185. Adoption provisions were at issue in Stanley, Quilloin, Caban, and Lehr.
See supra Part III.
186. Recall that the putative father is merely alleged to be the biological father.
See supra note 5.
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edged father’s efforts by removing the automatic maternal sole cus
tody awards in cases where the father has established paternity
would begin to address the unconstitutional disparity these statutes
create between unmarried mothers and fathers.187 The next step
would then be to establish a preference for joint legal custody in
these cases, a step that would appropriately declare that the unwed
father who establishes paternity—and thus his legal obligation to
his child—is entitled to the same legal rights as the unwed mother.
The implementation of a statutory scheme based on parental
activity would not be breaking new ground. Several states have
taken this approach with their joint custody schemes.188 And in two
of the adoption cases decided by the Supreme Court, the Court up
held statutes that awarded paternal rights only after the putative
father asserted some legal action reflecting his parentage.189 Both
statutes unsuccessfully challenged in Lehr and Quilloin in fact
granted the father the contested rights upon legitimization190 or re
gistration of paternity,191 reflecting an appropriate distinction be
tween fathers who have been legally recognized and those who
have not.
Once an unmarried father is recognized as the unmarried
mother’s equivalent, he is afforded substantial protection of his
187. The Lehr Court noted that if the putative father “grasps [the] opportunity
[to develop a relationship with his offspring] and accepts some measure of responsibil
ity for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development.” Lehr v. Robertson,
463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). A timely adjudication of paternity would seem to fit this
description because a father who has established paternity of his child has arguably
accepted “some” measure of responsibility for his child.
188. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 245 (2007) (providing that custody statute
applies to unmarried parents if both parents have “formally acknowledged” the
nonmarital child); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.541(2)(a) (West 2007) (providing that a pre
sumption in favor of joint legal custody applies once “paternity has been acknowledged
[and established]”); MARTIN L. SWADEN & LINDA A. OLUP, MINNESOTA PRACTICE
SERIES: FAMILY LAW § 18:17 (3d ed. 2009), available at 14 MNPRAC § 18:17 (Westlaw)
(“Minnesota law makes a differentiation relative to fathers’ rights for custody and
parenting time by putting them into two groups: one group of alleged fathers, where
paternity has not been acknowledged and established; the other group where paternity
has been acknowledged and established.”); see also infra Appendix.
189. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 264-65, 268 (power to veto adoption); Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (notice of adoption).
190. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248-49 (“To acquire the same [adoption] veto authority
possessed by other parents, the father of a child born out of wedlock must legitimate his
offspring . . . [U]nless and until the child is legitimated, the mother is the only recog
nized parent . . . .”).
191. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-51 (“A man who files with th[e] [putative father] regis
try demonstrates his intent to claim paternity of a child born out of wedlock and is
therefore entitled to receive notice of any proceeding to adopt that child.”).
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rights.192 Even when the court endorses the State’s interest, the dis
tinction between similarly situated mothers and fathers may not
stand.193 Frequently, the asserted goal before the court is the pro
motion of the child’s best interest.194 However, as reflected in the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Stanley 195 and Caban,196 broad
gender-based classifications that purport to further that interest
may not be appropriate.
Ultimately, statutes that allocate or maintain sole legal custody
in an unwed mother once the father has established his paternity
should be subject to judicial scrutiny to determine whether the dis
tinction can be considered “reasonable, not arbitrary, and [resting]
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial rela
tion to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir
cumstanced shall be treated alike.”197 Given the multitude of
factual scenarios that may present themselves to the court, it is in
appropriate to place the same burden on all unwed fathers subject
to such custody awards. These overinclusive statutes would appear
contrary to the very nature of the Equal Protection Clause.198 As
such, custody statutes for nonmarital children that provide for ma
ternal presumptions of sole legal custody—especially when the fa
ther has been legally recognized—should fail under constitutional
challenge.199
192. See id. at 261, 267.
193. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979). Although the
Court certainly found the promotion of the nonmarital child’s interest “an important
one,” the distinction between unmarried mothers and fathers was not “structured rea
sonably to further” that interest. Id. at 391. Notably, the Caban Court dismissed the
State’s alternative justification that a mother has a fundamentally closer relationship
with the child than does the father, relying on the facts of that case as evidence to the
contrary. Id. at 389.
194. See, e.g., Caban, 441 U.S. at 391 (“providing for the well-being of illegitimate
children”); Lehr, 463 U.S. at 266 (“promot[ing] the best interests of the child”); Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972) (“protect[ing] ‘the moral, emotional, mental, and
physical welfare of the minor . . . .’” (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-02)).
195. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-54.
196. Caban, 441 U.S. at 391.
197. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Vir
ginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
198. The Caban Court did not tolerate New York’s “overbroad generalizations,”
holding that the “undifferentiated distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fa
thers . . . [did] not bear a substantial relationship to the State’s asserted interests.”
Caban, 441 U.S. at 394.
199. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.5, at 197-98 (“[A] flat rule excluding the father without regard to his conduct or interest in the child would still seem to be in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause as the Supreme Court has applied it to
illegitimates.”).
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2. Custody Statutes and Overbroad Classifications
In addition to the requirement that the gender-based maternal
custody awards be subject to heightened scrutiny, the fact that these
statutes consider all unwed fathers to be in one universal category
suggests an additional, inherent defect. The Supreme Court has
recognized that overbroad generalizations are impermissible and
subject to constitutional challenge.200 As applied to unwed fathers,
the classification imposed by the presumptive maternal sole custody
award meets the standard of an overbroad generalization as defined
in United Stated v. Virginia 201 and is thus unconstitutional.
There are many types of fathers that may approach the court
looking for joint legal custody. Some of these fathers may be leav
ing long-term relationships with the mother of their children; others
may have only known their partners for a short period of time.
Some fathers may be extremely caring, involved, and dedicated to
fatherhood; others may be distant, detached, and undecided on the
idea of parenting a child. Some may be educated and ambitious;
others may be uneducated and unmotivated.
What is significant is that each category of father just described
may apply to a divorcing father or a never-married father. By
grouping all unmarried fathers together and imposing on them a
greater burden to achieve joint legal custody, the state is declaring
that unmarried fathers in general are less suited to be parents than
unmarried mothers or divorcing fathers.202 This, in spite of the fact
that some unmarried fathers may be extremely qualified parents
and some divorcing fathers may barely know their children. Such
an overbroad generalization is both overinclusive and underinclu
sive and is repugnant to the Constitution.203
To remedy these unconstitutional burdens, the state must not
ask whether unmarried parents in contested custody disputes
should be forced into joint custody arrangements but whether the
state can constitutionally impose a greater burden towards shared
200. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (State’s justification “must
not rely on overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or prefer
ences of males and females”); accord Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 76 (2001) (O’Connor,
J., dissenting); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 139 n. 11 (1994); Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976); see Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25
(1982).
201. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34.
202. As the Court said in Stanley, “all unmarried fathers are not [unsuitable and
neglectful parents]; some are wholly suited to have custody of their children.” Stanley
v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 654 (1972).
203. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533.
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decision-making responsibilities on fathers “who have the will and
capacity” to be excellent parents to their children.204 Only when
these statutes draw distinctions that more closely align with a par
ent’s likelihood of success205 will they begin to shed the unconstitu
tionality of overbroad generalizations.
3. Custody Statutes and Marital Status Distinctions
Statutes that award a broader set of rights to a divorcing father,
compared to an unmarried father, would likely be subject to ra
tional basis review under the United States Constitution because
marital status is not recognized as a class that deserves heightened
scrutiny.206 Under this standard, the classification scheme must be
“rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”207 The burden of
proof lies with the challenger, and the presumption he must over
come is significant: statutes under rational basis review are rarely
overturned because legislative decision makers are given great
deference.208
The unmarried father looking to challenge a statutory scheme
that creates a presumption of joint legal custody in divorcing par
204. Id. at 542.
205. For example, a statute could distinguish between alleged parents and ac
knowledged parents.
206. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 94, § 9.7, at 782. The only categories that
automatically receive heightened levels of scrutiny are race, national origin, gender,
alienage, or legitimacy. Id.
207. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985)
(“The general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”).
208. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 94, § 9.2.1,
at 678. But see Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 966 (Mass. 2004)
(acknowledging that the state legislature is owed “great deference . . . to decide social
and policy issues” but reserving for the judiciary questions of constitutional law). Al
though it is possible for a facially neutral statutory scheme to receive heightened scru
tiny, there are significant evidentiary hurdles to overcome. In Personnel Administrator
of Massachusetts v. Feeney, the Supreme Court required the challenger to prove both
discriminatory impact and discriminatory intent in order to for the Court to apply
heightened scrutiny to a gender neutral statute. 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). The statute in
Feeney gave preference to qualified veterans (versus nonveterans) for state civil service
positions. Id. at 259, 263. There was an extremely apparent disparate impact: over
ninety-eight percent of veterans in Massachusetts were male. Id. at 270. However, to
prove discriminatory purpose, the statute must have been enacted “because of,” and
not simply “in spite of,” a desire to harm. Id. at 279. Absent proof that the legislature
was driven by a gender-based discriminatory purpose in drafting the statute, the Su
preme Court upheld the statute. Id. at 281. Although the question of whether unmar
ried fathers are a suspect class subject to intentional discrimination is beyond the scope
of this Note, see McNeely, supra note 20, at 942-45 for a discussion of this issue as
applied to a facially neutral child custody statute.

R
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ents, with no such presumption in unmarried parents, faces hurdles
similar to those faced by the unwed father challenging the genderbased statutory scheme.209 Primarily, the unwed father will need to
establish that he is similarly situated to the divorcing father and that
there is no rational justification for treating the two classes of fa
thers differently. This argument needs to address the marital-status
distinction made in Quilloin.210
As with the gender-based classification challenge, the unwed
father will be best equipped to challenge the statute if he legally
asserts his paternity. The argument would rest on the putative fa
ther’s acceptance of responsibility to care for and financially sup
port his child, in much the same way the divorcing father once did
when he entered into marriage. With this legal status secured, the
unwed father can distinguish himself from the putative father in
Quilloin, who ultimately failed to convince the Supreme Court that
he should have been treated equally with divorcing fathers.211 By
highlighting the importance of the divorcing father’s legal accept
ance of responsibility for his children,212 the Quilloin Court seemed
to suggest that the putative father who also accepts responsibility
for his child by legally acknowledging his paternity may then be
treated under the same standard as the divorcing father.
Although an unmarried father may convince a court that he
should be recognized as the divorcing father’s equal,213 he faces the
higher constitutional hurdle imposed by the lower standard of re
209. See supra Part VI.A.1.
210. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978).
211. Id. This distinction would be critical, as the Court in Quilloin declared that
the “[appellant father]’s interests [were] readily distinguishable from those of a sepa
rated or divorced father.” Id.
212. Id. (“[E]ven a father whose marriage has broken apart will have borne full
responsibility for the rearing of his children during the period of [his] marriage.”). Of
course, there is an argument to be made that some marriages end shortly after they
begin, and some of these short-term marriages result in separations before the child is
born, placing those fathers on what would seem to be identical footing as the putative
father looking to assert his rights when his nonmarital child is born. See Brief of the
Appellant at 19, 20, Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) (No. 76-6372), 1977 WL
189165, at *19, 20 (comparing unmarried fathers to divorcing fathers from short-term
marriages).
213. Though differences in demographics, conflict level, and nonresidential in
volvement exist between unmarried and divorcing fathers, there are similarities. See
Glendessa M. Insabella et al., Individual and Coparenting Differences Between Divorc
ing and Unmarried Fathers, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 290, 301 (2003) (finding group similarities
between unmarried and divorcing fathers in terms of the father’s mental health, the
father-child relationship’s susceptibility to negative forces, and the father’s payment of
child support).
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view. Put another way, rationality review presumes the statute is
constitutional and therefore places the burden of proof on the chal
lenger “to negative every conceivable basis which might support”
the statutory classification.214 Although the constitutional chal
lenge to a statute that provides a joint legal custody presumption
only for divorcing parents may seem like a futile battle, there are
strong policy reasons for state legislatures to seriously consider
joint legal custody presumptions.
B. Custody Statutes and State Policy
Custody statutes reflect a state legislature’s policy decision
with respect to what is in the best interest of the child. The substan
tial split among the states215 signifies the difficulty and disagree
ment inherent in choosing the best policy for decision-making and
residential arrangements for children postdivorce or postsepara
tion. However, since the mid-1970s, the general trend has been to
ward joint custody awards, preferences, and presumptions.216 Joint
legal custody especially has become a common outcome for parents
after divorce.217 This trend represents the recognition that, when
parents can work together, a joint custody arrangement of some
kind is best for the child.218 Unfortunately, the trend falls far short
of universal acceptance because many states do not recognize the
potential benefits of carefully crafted joint legal custody presump
tions. These state legislatures should take a closer look at the bene
fits of encouraging joint legal custody, especially for unmarried
parents.
Joint legal custody has been shown in the context of divorce to
increase a father’s involvement with his child, including parenting
214. See Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53, 75 (2001) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quot
ing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320-21 (1993)).
215. See supra Part V.
216. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.5, at 815 (noting that “[j]oint custody has
become a significant option for trial courts in custody cases during the years since
1975”); ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLI
NARY MODELS FOR DIVORCING FAMILIES 46 (2004) (“[I]n the late 1970s and the early
1980s [courts began] to award joint custody even over the opposition of one or both
parents.”).
217. Christy M. Buchanan & Parissa L. Jahromi, A Psychological Perspective on
Shared Custody Arrangements, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 419, 422 (2008).
218. DEBORAH ANNA LUEPNITZ, CHILD CUSTODY: A STUDY OF FAMILIES AFTER
DIVORCE 150 (1982) (noting that “joint custody at its best is superior to single-parent
custody at its best”).
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time and overnights.219 Subsequent research suggests the same out
come for unwed fathers.220 Given the well-established importance
of a father in his child’s life,221 law makers should seriously look at
the recent research that supports a greater role for unwed fathers in
their children’s lives.
Further, there is a recognized interest in getting more putative
fathers to legally recognize their fatherhood and accept responsibil
ity for their children.222 As more fathers step forward, more child
support becomes available and more children may receive greater
financial support.223 Children born out of wedlock are especially in
need of this additional financial support, for data show that
219. Chien-Chung Huang et al., Child Support Enforcement, Joint Legal Custody,
and Parental Involvement, SOC. SERV. REV., June 2003, at 255, 275; Judith A. Seltzer,
Father by Law: Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement with
Children, 35 DEMOGRAPHY 135, 141-44 (1998). The Seltzer study controlled for differ
ences in the quality of family relationships and concluded that these differences “[did]
not explain the positive association between joint legal custody and paternal involve
ment after divorce.” Id. at 144.
220. Judith A. Seltzer, Families Formed Outside of Marriage, 62 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 1247, 1262 (2000) (“[B]oth joint legal custody and paternity establishment may
increase fathers’ involvement with children.”).
221. McNeely, supra note 20, at 921-22 (reviewing data indicating “that children
without fathers are more likely to suffer increased psychological, educational, behav
ioral, and health disorders, and our society is more likely to suffer increased crime and
violence”); see also Ferreiro, supra note 8, at 421 (noting several studies that support
the positive role a father’s involvement has in his child’s life); Marsha Klein Pruett et
al., The Hand that Rocks the Cradle: Maternal Gatekeeping After Divorce, 27 PACE L.
REV. 709, 716 (2007) (noting that “[t]he father-child relationship is salient because of
the consistent finding that children with active, involved fathers fare better emotionally,
behaviorally, and cognitively”). A recent British research study found that the more a
father was involved with his child, the higher the child’s IQ would be at the age of
eleven. Daniel Nettle, Why Do Some Dads Get More Involved than Others? Evidence
from a Large British Cohort, 29 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 416, 416, 420-21 (2008).
222. Seltzer, supra note 220, at 1262 (“Increases in paternity establishment reflect
federal emphasis on the need for legal paternity establishment as a first step in assigning
child support orders and collecting formal child support on behalf of children born
outside of marriage.”).
223. See, e.g., DIANE N. LYE, REPORT TO THE WASHINGTON STATE GENDER AND
JUSTICE COMMISSION AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COMMISSION 4-19 (1999). Dr. Lye
reports,
Virtually every researcher who has studied the issue reports that more fre
quent child-nonresidential parent contact is associated with improved child
support compliance. Fathers who see their children more often and are active
participants in their lives make child support payments more frequently and
are more likely to pay the full amount than fathers who have little or no con
tact with their children.
Id.; see also ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD:
SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 275, 286 (1992); Margaret F. Brinig &
F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393, 393,
423 (1998); Melissa A. Tracy, The Equally Shared Parenting Time Presumption—A
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nonmarital children are more likely to be economically disadvan
taged.224 It is certainly a possibility that more fathers will be inter
ested in establishing paternity if there are some legal rights, as well
as significant parental responsibilities, that come with the financial
obligation.225 Knowing that he has a legal right to be involved in
his child’s life, the unmarried father may then present himself to the
mother, or to the court, voluntarily and at an earlier stage in the
child’s life.
Finally, legislative endorsements of joint legal custody also re
sult in more divorcing parents voluntarily choosing joint legal cus
tody as a parenting option.226 Because several studies support this
outcome,227 it is reasonable to believe that joint custody legislation
would have a similar effect with never-married parents.
At the other end of the spectrum, presumptions of sole legal
(or physical) custody in favor of the unwed mother provide her with
leverage that can ultimately reduce a father’s involvement with his
child. Often, to overcome the presumption, an unwed father must
first demonstrate shared responsibilities and effective communica
tion before even getting to the best interest of the child analysis.228
As a result, if a father suspects that he might not overcome that
initial hurdle in a contested dispute, he may settle for fewer paren
tal rights in order to forgo protracted and potentially unsuccessful
litigation.229 An unwed father may be even less likely to raise a
valid challenge considering the perception that courts tend to favor
mothers over fathers.230
Critics of joint custody argue that joint custody arrangements
are harmful to the children, especially in hostile relationships.
Cure-All or a Quagmire for Tennessee Child Custody Law?, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 153,
174, 181 (2007).
224. See Marcia J. Carlson et al., Coparenting & Nonresident Fathers’ Involvement
with Young Children After a Nonmarital Birth, 45 DEMOGRAPHY 461, 462 (2008) (citing
studies).
225. Cf. Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Di
vorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 984-85 (2005) (discussing the positive
effect a joint legal custody presumption would have on divorcing fathers and noting that
“[f]athers who believe they can play important roles and influence their children’s lives
are more likely to be involved in their upbringing”).
226. Seltzer, supra note 219, at 140.
227. See Huang et al., supra note 219, at 256.
228. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(a) (2008).
229. See Linda D. Elrod & Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum
Swings in Child Custody: The Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 390
(2009).
230. This perception becomes elevated in states that articulate a pro-mother pol
icy in their paternity statutes.
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However, the evidence does not bear out such a hypothesis in di
vorcing parents.231 Although the data are lacking with respect to
unmarried parents, there is no evidence showing that joint legal
custody would result in negative outcomes for nonmarital children.
C. The Massachusetts Custody Statutes
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts presents the perfect
storm for an equal rights challenge of a maternal legal custody pre
sumption. The Massachusetts custody statute for children born out
of wedlock contains a clear gender-based distinction by providing
that the mother, prior to and after acknowledgement or adjudica
tion of paternity and until further order of the court, will retain sole
custody of the nonmarital child.232 Massachusetts has also adopted
an equal rights amendment, which commands gender “[e]quality
under the law.”233 As a result, the nonmarital custody statute’s fa
cial gender-based distinction is subject to strict judicial scrutiny in
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and should be considered
unconstitutional.234
In contested custody disputes involving nonmarital children,
the Massachusetts custody statute creates a rebuttable presumption
that physical and legal custody of the child vests at birth and there
after remains solely with the mother, unless and until the putative
father (1) is legally recognized as the biological father of the child,
(2) can establish that both he and the mother shared responsibility
for the child prior to the litigation, and (3) can prove that he and
the mother can effectively communicate about the child’s best in
terests.235 This gender-based distinction is clearly articulated in the
language of the statute:
231. See Buchanan & Jahromi, supra note 217, at 424. These authors caution that
evidence suggesting “that joint legal and joint physical custody are associated with as
pects of relationships and parenting that tend to predict positive outcomes for children”
comes from studies where parents were likely to be more cooperative with each other.
Id. at 425. However, “there is little evidence that sharing custody either in the legal or
the physical sense leads to increased conflict,” id. at 424, therefore suggesting there is
more to gain than there is to lose by creating a rebuttable presumption of joint legal
custody. See id. at 439 (“[T]here appear to be potential benefits of and little harm from
presumptions for joint legal custody.”).
232. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(b).
233. MASS. CONST. art. I, amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVI.
234. Cf. CLARK, supra note 22, § 19.4, at 802 (noting that states that have
adopted an equal rights amendment have found the tender-years doctrine
unconstitutional).
235. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(a), (b). The burden this imposes on the
unwed father is almost insurmountable: the mere fact that the mother contests any or

R
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Prior to or in the absence of an adjudication or voluntary
acknowledgment of paternity, the mother shall have custody of a
child born out of wedlock. In the absence of an order or judg
ment of a probate and family court relative to custody, the
mother shall continue to have custody of a child after an adjudica
tion of paternity or voluntary acknowledgment of parentage.236

For gender-based statutory distinctions, the Massachusetts Consti
tution requires judicial scrutiny of the highest order.237
In 1976, article 106 of the Amendments to the Constitution was
approved to amend article 1 of the Massachusetts Declaration of
Rights to read,
All people are born free and equal and have certain natural,
essential and unalienable rights; among which may be reckoned
the right of enjoying and defending their lives and liberties; that
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property; in fine, that of
seeking and obtaining their safety and happiness. Equality under
the law shall not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color,
creed or national origin.238

These two sentences, known as the Equal Rights Amendment
(“ERA”), have been understood to command an equal protection
requirement stricter than that imposed by the Fourteenth Amend
der of joint custody can support an argument that the parties cannot effectively commu
nicate. This maternal control is sometimes categorized as “maternal gatekeeping.”
Pruett et al., supra note 221, at 712 (defining restrictive or strict maternal gatekeeping
as “the beliefs and behaviors that inhibit a collaborative effort between fathers and
mothers by limiting men’s opportunity/ability to actively care for and rear their chil
dren”). In the context of divorce,
[i]t is theorized that strict gatekeeping may result in less involvement by
the nonresidential parent and feelings of insecurity in children regarding their
relationship with that parent. . . .
Results from the few studies of gatekeeping with divorced populations
converge on findings that mothers’ support is key to father involvement after
divorce, and that his non-residential status along with her perceptions of his
competence lead to more restrictive maternal gatekeeping.
Id. at 717 (footnote omitted). The Massachusetts statute for children born out of wed
lock could arguably be considered an enabling statute for maternal gatekeeping.
236. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(b) (emphasis added).
237. Opinion of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d 426, 427
(Mass. 1977).
238. MASS. CONST. art. I (emphasis added), amended by MASS. CONST. art. CVI;
accord Attorney Gen. v. Mass. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d 284, 286 n.4
(Mass. 1979); Jes Kraus, Monkey See, Monkey Do: On Baker, Goodridge, and the Need
for Consistency in Same-Sex Alternatives to Marriage, 26 VT. L. REV. 959, 967 n.55
(2002).
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ment.239 The Commonwealth’s freedom to provide a broader net
of protection is fundamental to the governing structure of our na
tion240 and ultimately commands that gender-based statutory classi
fication be subject to strict judicial scrutiny.241 Under this standard
of review, the gender classification “will be upheld only if a compel
ling interest justifies the classification and if the impact of the classi
fication is limited as narrowly as possible consistent with its proper
purpose.”242 This standard of review mimics the strict scrutiny lan
guage applied to racial classifications under the United States Con
stitution243 and was so intended.244
Applied to the nonmarital child custody statute, it would ap
pear that the gender classifications should not stand.245 At the very
least, the provision mandating that the unwed mother “shall con
tinue to have custody,”246 even after the father is legally recognized,
should be subject to revision. Once the father has been identified
and legally recognized, his decision-making rights should be equal
239. Lowell v. Kowalski, 405 N.E.2d 135, 138 (1980) (“[T]he requirements of the
Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) to the Massachusetts Constitution are more stringent
than the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection requirements.”); Mass. Interscholas
tic Athletic Ass’n, 393 N.E.2d at 291 (“We have held under ERA that classifications on
the basis of sex are subject to a degree of constitutional scrutiny ‘at least as strict as the
scrutiny required by the Fourteenth Amendment for racial classifications.’” (quoting
Commonwealth v. King, 372 N.E.2d 196 (Mass. 1977))); Risa E. Kaufman, State ERAS
in the New Era: Securing Poor Women’s Equality by Eliminating Reproductive-Based
Discrimination, 24 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 191, 210 n.93 (2001) (“The ERA’s protection
against sex-based distinctions is consistent with other provisions in the Massachusetts
Constitution that provide greater protections for individuals than provided for by the
U.S. Constitution.”); cf. Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 959 (Mass.
2003) (“The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of personal liberty against
government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the Federal Constitu
tion, even where both Constitutions employ essentially the same language.”).
240. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959.
241. Lowell, 405 N.E.2d at 139 (“A statutory classification based on sex is subject
to strict judicial scrutiny under the State ERA . . . .”).
242. Id.; accord Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring); Opinion
of the Justices to the House of Representatives, 371 N.E.2d 426, 427 (1977).
243. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (stating that strict scru
tiny analysis requires that the means be “narrowly tailored measures that further com
pelling governmental interests” (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
244. See Kaufman, supra note 239, at 210.
245. See CLARK, supra note 22, § 4.5, at 198. “It would . . . seem correct to say
that in those states which have adopted a state Equal Rights Amendment there could
not constitutionally be a preference given to the mother over the father of the illegiti
mate child with respect to custody.” Id. (footnote omitted). Other states operating
under an Equal Rights Amendment have concluded likewise. See, e.g., People ex rel.
Irby v. Dubois, 354 N.E.2d 562, 565-66 (Ill. Ct. App. 1976).
246. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 209C, § 10(b) (2008).
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to those of the child’s mother.247 Further, by not distinguishing be
tween physical or legal custody, the statute is not narrowly drawn to
account for the myriad of circumstances that custody disputes fre
quently present. Similarly, by grouping, and equally burdening, all
putative and recognized unwed fathers together, the statute fails to
address the spectrum of fathers that are looking for contact with
their children. Finally, by drawing a distinction that reflects “in
grained assumptions with respect to historically accepted roles of
men and women within the institution of marriage,” and outside it,
the statute must be examined “in light of the unequivocal language
of art. 1, in order to ensure that the governmental conduct chal
lenged here conforms to the supreme charter of [the Common
wealth of Massachusetts].”248
The challenge should not end there. Divorcing parents in Mas
sachusetts are granted temporary joint legal custody of the marital
child.249 All of the same policy considerations discussed earlier
under the federal Constitution250 support the same argument that
joint legal custody is a viable solution for unmarried parents as well
as divorcing parents. Further, a rationality review that “is not
‘toothless’”251 supports the argument that such a statutory scheme
should be scrutinized with something greater than sweeping
deference.
CONCLUSION
When a child is conceived, nature dictates that a biological
mother and father play some part in the child’s creation. But when
that child is conceived and born out of wedlock, the laws of several
states, including Massachusetts, distinguish the rights of the mother
and father based simply on the sex of the parent. Even if the father
has, from the moment of his awareness of the impending birth of
his child, expended every effort to be a part of the pregnancy, birth,
and rearing of the child, unless the mother is cooperative, the un
247. See supra Part VI.A.1.
248. Goodridge v. Dep’t Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 973 (Mass. 2003)
(Greaney, J., concurring).
249. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31.
250. See supra Part VI.B.
251. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 960 n.20 (quoting Murphy v. Comm’r of the Dep’t
of Indus. Accidents, 612 N.E.2d 1149 (Mass. 1993)). Rationality review in Massachu
setts “requires that ‘an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification
would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the
disadvantaged class.’” Id. at 960. (quoting English v. New Eng. Med. Ctr., 541 N.E.2d
329 (Mass. 1989)).
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wed father finds himself at a significant—and unconstitutional—
disadvantage. Similarly, although a father may have been in a longterm relationship with the mother of the child and may have a sub
stantial relationship with his son or daughter, a vindictive mother
may control the outcome of a custodial decision under the laws of
Massachusetts.
The custody scheme in Massachusetts needs to be reviewed
and revised to recognize what many other states have already ob
served: that although there may never have been the legal commit
ment of marriage, there still remains a constitutional mandate that
requires the state to treat both unmarried parents with an equal
hand when it comes to evaluating a joint legal custody plan.
Bernardo Cuadra*

* J.D., Western New England College School of Law, 2010; Managing Editor,
Western New England Law Review. Thank you to my family for all your support. And
thank you to my son, Dillon, to whom this Note is dedicated and to whom I owe
everything.
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APPENDIX—JOINT CUSTODY STATUTES
Alabama: ALA. CODE § 30-3-152(a) (LexisNexis 1998) (“The court
shall in every case consider joint custody but may award any form
of custody which is determined to be in the best interest of the
child.”); id. § 30-3-152(b) (“The court may order a form of joint
custody without the consent of both parents, when it is in the best
interest of the child.”); id. § 30-3-152(c) (“If both parents request
joint custody, the presumption is that joint custody is in the best
interest of the child.”); DuBois v. DuBois, 714 So. 2d 308, 309 (Ala.
Civ. App. 1998) (holding that joint custody is not presumed when
both parties do not agree). No presumption in favor of either par
ent arises during an initial custody determination, regardless of
marital status. T.T.W. v. V.A., 868 So. 2d 445, 449 (Ala. Civ. App.
2003) (unwed parents); Nye v. Nye, 785 So. 2d 1147, 1148-49 (Ala.
Civ. App. 2000) (divorced parents). However, until an unmarried
father has legitimated his child, there is a presumption of awarding
custody of the nonmarital child to the mother. B.E.B. v. H.M., 822
So. 2d 429, 430-31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001). Note that the father’s
acknowledgment of his child is not enough. Id.
Alaska: ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060(b) (2008) (“Neither parent, re
gardless of the question of the child’s legitimacy, is entitled to pref
erence in the awarding of custody.”); id. § 25.20.060(c) (“The court
may award shared custody to both parents if shared custody is de
termined by the court to be in the best interests of the child.”).
Alaska has a preference for joint legal custody, but the preference
does not apply if the parents cannot communicate or cooperate.
Jaymont v. Skillings-Donat, 216 P.3d 534, 540 (Alaska 2009); Farrell
v. Farrell, 819 P.2d 896, 898 n.1, 899 (Alaska 1991) (quoting session
laws). This preference appears to afford the trial court authority to
award joint legal custody even when one parent objects. Parks v.
Parks, 214 P.3d 295, 303 (Alaska 2009) (sustaining award of joint
legal custody over wife’s challenge); see also Spohnholz v. Johnson,
No. S-12529, 2007 WL 2685216, at *2 (Alaska Sept. 12, 2007) (not
ing that the “trial court relied on the legislative preference for joint
legal custody” and sustaining joint custody award over unwed
mother’s challenge).
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.01(A) (2007) (“In
awarding child custody, the court may order sole custody or joint
custody. This section does not create a presumption in favor of one
custody arrangement over another. The court in determining cus
tody shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that parent’s
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sex.”); id. § 25-803(D) (“In any case in which paternity is estab
lished the parent with whom the child has resided for the greater
part of the last six months shall have legal custody unless otherwise
ordered by the court.”). The custody provisions apply to unmarried
parents. See Buencamino v. Noftsinger, 221 P.3d 41, 42 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2009) (noting that the lower court properly awarded joint cus
tody to unmarried parents under section 25.403.01). The Buen
camino court addressed the joint custody issue in an unpublished
decision. Buencamino v. Noftsinger, No. 1 CA-CV 08-0374, 2009
WL 4264348 (Ariz. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2009).
Arkansas: ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(a)(1)(A)(i) (2009) (“In an
action for divorce, the award of custody of a child of the marriage
shall be made without regard to the sex of a parent but solely in
accordance with the welfare and best interest of the child.”); Gray
v. Gray, 239 S.W.3d 26, 29 (Ark. Ct. App. 2006) (“Joint custody or
equally divided custody of minor children is not favored in Arkan
sas unless circumstances clearly warrant such action.”). Unmarried
mothers have a greater right to custody of the nonmarital child than
the unmarried father. ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-10-113(a) (“When a
child is born to an unmarried woman, legal custody of that child
shall be in the woman giving birth to the child until the child
reaches eighteen (18) years of age unless a court of competent juris
diction enters an order placing the child in the custody of another
party.”); Thomas v. Avant, 260 S.W.3d 266, 272-73 (Ark. 2007).
California: CAL. FAM. CODE § 3021 (West 2004) (“This part applies
in any of the following: (a) A proceeding for dissolution of mar
riage. . . . (f) A proceeding to determine physical or legal custody or
visitation in an action pursuant to the Uniform Parentage Act
. . . .”); id. § 3040(a) (“In making an order granting custody to ei
ther parent, the court . . . shall not prefer a parent as custodian
because of that parent’s sex.”); id. § 3040(b) (“This section estab
lishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint
legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the
court and the family the widest discretion to choose a parenting
plan that is in the best interest of the child.”); id. § 3080 (“There is a
presumption . . . that joint custody is in the best interest of a minor
child . . . where the parents have agreed to joint custody . . . .”).
Colorado: COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a) (West Supp.
2009) (“The court, upon the motion of either party or its own mo
tion, may make provisions for parenting time that the court finds
are in the child’s best interests . . . .”); id. § 14-10-124(1.5)(b) (“The
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court, upon the motion of either party or its own motion, shall allo
cate the decision-making responsibilities between the parties based
upon the best interests of the child. In determining decision-mak
ing responsibility, the court may allocate the decision-making re
sponsibility with respect to each issue affecting the child mutually
between both parties or individually to one or the other party or
any combination thereof.”); id. § 14-10-124(3) (“In determining
parenting time or decision-making responsibilities, the court shall
not presume that any person is better able to serve the best inter
ests of the child because of that person’s sex.”). The custody provi
sions apply to unmarried parents. See N.A.H. v. S.L.S., 9 P.3d 354,
363 (Colo. 2000) (“Colorado law also directs trial judges to return
to the best interests of the child standard after paternity has been
established, when the court resolves issues of parenting time and
decision-making responsibilities.”); In re A.D., No. 09CA0756, 2010
WL 1238841, at *2 (Colo. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2010) (noting lower
court’s application of section 14-10-124(1.5) in paternity suit).
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56(a) (West 2009)
(“[T]he court may assign parental responsibility for raising the child
to the parents jointly, or may award custody to either parent . . . .”);
id. § 46b-56a(b) (“There shall be a presumption . . . that joint cus
tody is in the best interests of a minor child where the parents have
agreed to an award of joint custody . . . .”). The custody provisions
apply to unmarried parents. See id. § 46b-61 (applying custody pro
visions “[i]n all cases in which the parents of a minor child live sepa
rately”); Grynkewich v. McGinley, 490 A.2d 534, 535 n.2 (Conn.
App. Ct. 1985) (applying section 46b-61 to custody dispute between
unmarried parents); see also Hurtado v. Hurtado, 541 A.2d 873, 876
(Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (“[T]here is no presumption in favor of the
mother or the father as a custodial parent . . . .”).
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a) (2009) (“Where the
parents live apart, the Court may award the custody of their minor
child to either of them and neither shall benefit from any presump
tion of being better suited for such award.”); id. § 722(b) (“The
Court shall not presume that a parent, because of his or her sex, is
better qualified than the other parent to act as a joint or sole legal
custodian . . . .”); see also Roe v. Stansell, 1998 WL 665590, at *2-3
(Del. Fam. Ct. May 4, 1998) (applying sections 701 and 722 to un
married parents). In Delaware, parents are joint natural custodi
ans. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a); Roe, 1998 WL 665590, at *2.
This joint-custodial arrangement continues absent a court order.
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State v. Todd, 509 A.2d 1112, 1114-15 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986). How
ever, once the parties appear in court, there does not appear to be
any presumption that such an arrangement should continue. See
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 701(a); D.L.K. v. C.S., 1986 WL 9029, at
*1 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1986) (“Title 13 evidences no presump
tion in favor of joint custody.”).
D.C.: D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-914(a)(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2010)
(“There shall be a rebuttable presumption that joint custody is in
the best interest of the child or children . . . .”); Ysla v. Lopez, 684
A.2d 775, 780 (D.C. 1996) (applying custody statute to unmarried
parents).
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2010) (“The
court shall order that the parental responsibility for a minor child
be shared by both parents unless the court finds that shared paren
tal responsibility would be detrimental to the child.”); Decker v.
Lyle, 848 So. 2d 501, 503 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (holding custody
statute applies to unmarried parents).
Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3(a)(1) (Supp. 2009) (“In all cases
in which the custody of any child is at issue between the parents,
there shall be no prima-facie right to the custody of the child in the
father or mother. There shall be no presumption in favor of any
particular form of custody, legal or physical, nor in favor of either
parent.”). For unmarried parents, before a child is legitimated, the
biological mother maintains outright custody. Id. § 19-7-25. How
ever, once the unwed father legitimates the child, he “stands in the
same position as any other parent,” and section 19-9-3 applies.
Braynon v. Hilbert, 621 S.E.2d 529, 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (cita
tion and internal quotation marks omitted).
Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(a) (LexisNexis Supp.
2009) (“In actions for divorce, separation, annulment, separate
maintenance, or any other proceeding where there is at issue a dis
pute as to the custody of a minor child, the court . . . may make an
order for the custody of the minor child as may seem necessary or
proper.”); id. § 571-46(a)(1) (“Custody should be awarded to either
parent or to both parents according to the best interests of the child
. . . .”); id. § 571-46.1(a) (“Upon the application of either parent,
joint custody may be awarded in the discretion of the court.”).
Idaho: IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-717B(4) (2006) (“[A]bsent a pre
ponderance of the evidence to the contrary, there shall be a pre
sumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a minor child
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or children.”). “By its terms, section 32-717 only applies to actions
for divorce and to ‘children of the marriage,’ however, because no
specific criteria govern custody orders for non-marital children, we
have approved application of section 32-717 to situations where a
child’s parents are not, or have not been, married.” Bartosz v.
Jones, 197 P.3d 310, 315 n.1 (Idaho 2008); see also State v. Hart, 132
P.3d 1249, 1253-54 (Idaho 2006) (upholding joint custody award to
unmarried parents). There does not appear to be an automatic
award or preference for the unwed mother.
Illinois: 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602(c) (West Supp. 2010)
(“[T]he court shall presume that the maximum involvement and co
operation of both parents regarding the physical, mental, moral,
and emotional well-being of their child is in the best interest of the
child. There shall be no presumption in favor of or against joint
custody.”); id. 5/602.1(b) (“Upon the application of either or both
parents, or upon its own motion, the court shall consider an award
of joint custody.”). Illinois does not carry a presumption in favor of
either parent. See id. 5/602; cf. In re Marriage of Kennedy, 418
N.E.2d 947, 953 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (“[T]oday there is no rule re
quiring that a fit mother be given custody of her child of tender
years.”). The custody statute applies “[r]egardless of whether the
parents have ever been married.” Hall v. Hall, 589 N.E.2d 553, 555
(Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
Indiana: IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (West 2008) (“The court shall
determine custody and enter a custody order in accordance with the
best interests of the child.”); id. § 31-17-2-13 (“The court may
award legal custody of a child jointly if the court finds that an award
of joint legal custody would be in the best interest of the child.”).
For divorcing parents, “[i]n determining the best interests of the
child, there is no presumption favoring either parent.” Id. § 31-17
2-8. For unmarried parents, see id. § 31-14-13-2.3(a) (“In a pro
ceeding to which this chapter applies, the court may award legal
custody of a child jointly if the court finds that an award of joint
legal custody would be in the best interest of the child.”). As of this
printing, an unmarried father’s signature on a paternity affidavit
conferred sole legal custody on the unmarried mother. IND. CODE
ANN. § 16-37-2-2.1 (West 2007) (“[I]f a paternity affidavit is exe
cuted under this section, the child’s mother has sole legal custody of
the child unless another custody determination is made by a court
in a proceeding under [section] 31-14.”). Effective July 1, 2010, pa
ternity affidavits afford unmarried parents the option of agreeing to
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joint legal custody; absent agreement, however, the unmarried
mother will have sole legal custody until further order of the court.
Act of Mar. 21, 2010, 2010 Ind. ALS 25 (LEXIS). Once a court
makes an order of custody to unmarried parents, no presumption in
favor of either parent applies. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-14-13-2.
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (West Supp. 2010) (“The
court may provide for joint custody of the child by the parties.”); id.
§ 598.41(2)(a) (“On the application of either parent, the court shall
consider granting joint custody in cases where the parents do not
agree to joint custody.”). Although there is no presumption or de
fault of joint legal custody, Iowa law provides both parents with
equal access to child’s records. Id. § 598.41(1)(e) (“Unless other
wise ordered by the court in the custody decree, both parents shall
have legal access to information concerning the child, including but
not limited to medical, educational and law enforcement records.”).
“The criteria governing custody decisions are the same regardless of
whether the parties are dissolving their marriage or are unwed.”
Yarolem v. Ledford, 529 N.W.2d 297, 298 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994); see
also In re Rhyan, 756 N.W.2d 710, No. 92/06-1490, 2008 WL
4472300, at *2 (Iowa Aug. 15, 2008) (unpublished table decision)
(approving lower court’s custody award to unwed parents under
section 598.41). In custody disputes, “[t]here is no presumption in
favor of the mother or the father.” In re Marriage of Kunkel, 555
N.W.2d 250, 253 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996); see also Yarolem, 529
N.W.2d at 298.
Kansas: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(a)(4)(A) (2005) (listing joint
legal custody as the preferred custodial arrangement); In re Mar
riage of Debenham, 896 P.2d 1098, 1099 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (not
ing that “joint custody is preferred in Kansas”). It appears that this
preference applies to unmarried parents as well, although the courts
have not made that preference explicit. See Yordy v. Osterman,
149 P.3d 874, 875 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (applying section 60
1610(a)(4)(A) to unmarried parents); Smith v. Brungardt, 101 P.3d
740, No. 91653, 2004 WL 2848883, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (un
published table decision) (“Even though the parties were not mar
ried, each possess [sic] the same status as a formerly married parent
seeking custody in a divorce proceeding.”); cf. Carty v. Martin, 660
P.2d 540, 543-44 (Kan. 1983) (unwed father has a right to visitation
after paternity has been acknowledged or adjudicated).
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270(5) (LexisNexis Supp.
2009) (“The court may grant joint custody to the child’s parents . . .
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if it is in the best interest of the child.”). There is no preference for
either parent. Id. § 403.270(2) (“The court shall determine custody
in accordance with the best interests of the child and equal consid
eration shall be given to each parent . . . .”); Squires v. Squires, 854
S.W.2d 765, 768 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (“It is . . . clear that neither
parent is the preferred custodian . . . .”). There is no preference for
joint custody over sole custody. Squires, 854 S.W.2d at 768-70. Sec
tion 403.270 applies in custody disputes between unmarried parents.
See Dull v. George, 982 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998) (also
noting that “[t]he best interests standard applies equally when the
child is born out of wedlock”).
Louisiana: LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 132 (1999) (“In the absence of
agreement, or if the agreement is not in the best interest of the
child, the court shall award custody to the parents jointly . . . .”); id.
art. 132 cmt. b (Comments—1993) (noting this provision’s intention
to strengthen Louisiana’s preference for joint custody); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 245 (2007) (“In a proceeding in which custody of
an illegitimate child formally acknowledged by both parents is
sought by both parents, . . . custody shall be awarded in accordance
with [art. 132].”); see also D.R.S. v. L.E.K., No. 09-1274, 2010 La.
App. LEXIS 343, at *8 (La. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2010) (noting Louisi
ana’s “presumption in favor of joint custody”).
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(2)(D) (Supp. 2009)
(“The order of the court awarding parental rights and responsibili
ties must include the following: (1) Allocated parental rights and
responsibilities, shared parental rights and responsibilities or sole
parental rights and responsibilities . . . .”); id. § 1653(2)(E) (“The
court may not apply a preference for one parent over the other in
determining parental rights and responsibilities because of the par
ent’s gender . . . .”). The parental rights and responsibilities statute
applies to unmarried parents. See Leonard v. Boardman, 854 A.2d
869, 874 (Me. 2004); Costa v. Vogel, 777 A.2d 827, 828-29 (Me.
2001).
Maryland: MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-203(d)(1) (LexisNexis
2006) (“If the parents live apart, a court may award custody of a
minor child to either parent or joint custody to both parents.”); id.
§ 5-203(d)(2) (“Neither parent is presumed to have any right to cus
tody that is superior to the right of the other parent.”). The joint
custody award is just one option for the trial court to consider. See
Taylor v. Taylor, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (Md. 1986). Maryland courts
apply the same joint custody standard to unmarried parents. Bar
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ton v. Hirshberg, 767 A.2d 874, 886-87 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)
(reviewing and applying Taylor in custody dispute between unmar
ried parents).
Massachusetts: MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 31 (2008) (“Upon the
filing of an action . . . , the parents shall have temporary shared
legal custody of any minor child of the marriage . . . .”); id. ch.
209C, § 10(b) (“Prior to or in the absence of an adjudication or vol
untary acknowledgement of paternity, the mother shall have cus
tody of a child born out of wedlock. In the absence of an order
[from the court], the mother shall continue to have custody of a
child after an adjudication of paternity or voluntary acknowledge
ment of parentage.”).
Michigan: MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.26a(1) (West 2002) (“In
custody disputes between parents, the parents shall be advised of
joint custody. At the request of either parent, the court shall con
sider an award of joint custody . . . . In other cases joint custody
may be considered by the court.”). “[T]here is no statutory pre
sumption in favor of joint custody.” Pladars v. Pladars, No. 276052,
2007 WL 2891999, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 4, 2007); see also
Wellman v. Wellman, 512 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994).
The Child Custody Act applies to all custody disputes, including
those between unmarried parents. See Aichele v. Hodge, 673
N.W.2d 452, 457 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003). There is no preference for
mothers to receive custody. Vodvarka v. Grasmeyer, 675 N.W.2d
847, 856 n.15 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.541(2)(a) (West 2007) (“If pa
ternity has been acknowledged [and established] . . . the father’s
rights of parenting time or custody are determined under sections
518.17 and 518.175.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp.
2010) (“The court shall use a rebuttable presumption that upon re
quest of either or both parties, joint legal custody is in the best in
terests of the child.” (emphasis added)).
Mississippi: Mississippi law provides for the possibility of joint cus
tody but does not carry a presumption in favor of joint custody. See
MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(2)-(4) (West 2007). There is no mater
nal custodial presumption. Id. § 93-5-24(7). Once an unmarried fa
ther establishes paternity, he has the same custody rights as a
divorcing father. Brown v. Crum, 30 So. 3d 1254, 1258 (Miss. Ct.
App. 2010). Mississippi courts apply the same analysis when mak
ing a custody order of a marital or nonmarital child. See, e.g., Wil
liams v. Stockstill, 990 So. 2d 774, 776-78 (Miss. Ct. App. 2008)
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(nonmarital child); Mayfield v. Mayfield, 956 So. 2d 337, 341-42
(Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (marital children).
Missouri: Missouri law encourages parents to mutually participate
in the raising of their child but does not carry a presumption in
favor of joint custody. MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(4), (5) (West
Supp. 2010); In re Marriage of Kroeger-Eberhart v. Eberhart, 254
S.W.3d 38, 47 (Mo. Ct. App. 2007) (“This statute . . . does not create
a presumption in favor of joint custody.”). Joint custody may be
awarded to unmarried parents. See, e.g., L.J.S. v. F.R.S., 247
S.W.3d 921, 925-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) (applying section 452.375
to unmarried parents). There is no preference for either the
mother or the father in custody determinations, regardless of mari
tal status. MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 452.375(8); Edmison ex rel.
Edmison v. Clarke, 988 S.W.2d 604, 609 n.3 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999)
(noting there is no preference for either parent when the child is
born out of wedlock).
Montana: MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(1) (2009) (“The court shall
determine the parenting plan in accordance with the best interest of
the child.”); id. § 40-4-234 (providing for parenting plan criteria, in
cluding residential arrangements and decision-making authority).
Montana has eliminated its statutory presumption in favor of joint
custody. Czapranski v. Czpranski, 63 P.3d 499, 507 (Mont. 2003).
In paternity actions, custody is determined under the Uniform Par
entage Act. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-6-116(3); Schuman v.
Bestrom, 693 P.2d 536, 539 (Mont. 1985). However, when making
joint custody determinations for unmarried parents, the court ap
plies the best interest standard under section 40-4-212. See In re
N.P., 127 P.3d 1035, 1038 (Mont. 2006). Montana does not maintain
a custodial presumption in favor of the mother. Czapranski, 63
P.3d at 504. However, older decisions held that a court was “re
quired to give the mother custody of a child of tender years only
when other things [were] equal.” Libra v. Libra, 484 P.2d 748, 753
(Mont. 1971).
Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(3) (2008) (“Custody of a mi
nor child may be placed with both parents on a joint legal custody
or joint physical custody basis, or both . . . .”). Parenting plans shall
address the issues of custody in accordance with section 42-364 and
the best interests of the child. Id. § 43-2929(1). Joint custody may
be granted whether or not the parents agree, as long as the court
finds that joint custody is in the best interests of the child. Id. § 42
364(3). There is no presumption in favor of joint custody, and, his

\\server05\productn\W\WNE\32-3\WNE307.txt

650

unknown

Seq: 52

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

12-JUL-10

8:36

[Vol. 32:599

torically, Nebraska has disfavored joint custody arrangements.
Spence v. Bush, 703 N.W.2d 606, 610-11 (Neb. Ct. App. 2005); Dor
mann v. Dormann, 606 N.W.2d 837, 846 (Neb. Ct. App. 2000) (stat
ing that joint custody “will be reserved for only the rarest of
cases”). Recently, however, the Nebraska Supreme Court held that
when the Parenting Act applies to a custody dispute, the trial court
need not make specific findings as to why joint custody is in the
child’s best interests. State ex rel. Amanda M. v. Justin T., 777
N.W.2d 565, 568-69 (Neb. 2010). The Parenting Act applies to both
married and unmarried parents. NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-2925; see
Amanda M., 777 N.W.2d at 568-71. Note that the mother of a
nonmarital child “is initially entitled to automatic custody of the
child, [but] the issue must ultimately be resolved on the basis of the
fitness of the parents and the best interests of the child.” Coleman
v. Kahler, 766 N.W.2d 142, 149 (Neb. Ct. App. 2009) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.465 (LexisNexis 2004) (“If a
court has not made a determination regarding the custody of a child
and the parents of the child are married to each other, each parent
has joint legal custody of the child until otherwise ordered by a
court of competent jurisdiction.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 125.480(1)-(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2005) (providing for an award of
joint custody in divorce proceedings when in the best interest of the
child and establishing a preference for joint custody); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 125.490 (LexisNexis 2004) (establishing a presump
tion that joint custody is in the best interest of the child when both
parents agree); Mosley v. Figliuzzi, 930 P.2d 1110, 1116 (Nev. 1997)
(discussing joint custody presumption and preference). For unmar
ried parents, sole physical custody vests in the unmarried mother,
but only until the court enters an order of paternity. NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 126.031 (LexisNexis 2004). Once paternity is estab
lished, the courts apply the custody standards applicable to divorce
proceedings. See, e.g., Rohling v. Martin, No. 49986, 2009 WL
1456528, at *3 & n.1 (Nev. Apr. 13, 2009); see also Rico v. Rodri
guez, 120 P.3d 812, 816 (Nev. 2005) (applying to unmarried parents
the best interests test from divorce statute). There is no indication
in the statutory or case law, however, that a presumption in favor of
joint legal custody applies once paternity is established.
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 461-A:3(II) (Supp. 2009)
(“In cases where husband and wife or unwed parents are living
apart, . . . [a]ll applicable provisions of [section 461-A] . . . shall
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apply to such proceedings.”); id. § 461-A:5 (“[I]n the making of any
order relative to decision-making responsibility, there shall be a
presumption . . . that joint decision-making responsibility is in the
best interest of minor children . . . (II) [u]pon the application of
either parent for joint decision-making responsibility . . . .”).
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-4 (West 2002) (“In any proceed
ing involving the custody of a minor child, the rights of both parents
shall be equal and the court shall enter an order which may include:
a. Joint custody of a minor child to both parents . . . .”). The New
Jersey courts have stated that joint legal custody is the “preferred
arrangement,” Grover v. Terlaje, 879 A.2d 138, 142 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2005), but “a court should analyze both legal custody and
physical custody in reaching its conclusion whether joint legal cus
tody is appropriate or not.” Jackson v. Hagans, No. FD-07-520-06,
2007 WL 3006499, at *3 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Oct. 17, 2007).
New Jersey has eliminated marital- and gender-based differences in
the law of custody determinations. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-40
(“The parent and child relationship extends equally to every child
and to every parent, regardless of the marital status of the par
ents.”); Gubernat v. Deremer, 657 A.2d 856, 865-66 (N.J. 1995)
(discussing history of changes in the law and stating that “[t]he Leg
islature clearly has ended gender-based differences in marital and
parental rights”); see also Grover, 879 A.2d at 142-43 (discussing
application of joint custody and section 9:2-4 to unmarried parents).
New Mexico: N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(a) (West 2003) (“There
shall be a presumption that joint custody is in the best interests of a
child in an initial custody determination [between divorcing par
ents].”). There is no clear statement that the custody statute applies
to unmarried parents, and it is presumed, therefore, that this pre
sumption does not apply to them.
New York: N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 240(1)(a) (McKinney Supp.
2010) (providing for authority to enter custody orders in all custody
proceedings). New York courts award joint custody only when “the
parties involved are relatively stable, amicable parents . . . capable
of cooperating in making decisions on matters relating to the care
and welfare of the children.” In re McGivney, 748 N.Y.S.2d 794,
795 (App. Div. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omit
ted); see Fullam v. Fullam, 835 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456 (App. Div. 2007)
(holding that joint legal custody to divorcing parents was in child’s
best interests); Williams v. Boger, 822 N.Y.S.2d 647, 648 (App. Div.
2006) (noting lower court’s award of joint legal custody to unmar
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ried parents with a history of cooperative parenting). New York
expresses no preference for either parent. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 240(1)(a) (“In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the
custody of the child in either parent.”); Mohen v. Mohen, 862
N.Y.S.2d 75, 77 (App. Div. 2008).
North Carolina: N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a) (2009) (“Joint cus
tody to the parents shall be considered upon the request of either
parent.”); Hall v. Hall, 655 S.E.2d 901, 907 n.3 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008)
(“There is no presumption in favor of joint custody . . . .”). North
Carolina has eliminated any preference or presumption for custody
in the mother. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(a). (“Between the
mother and father, whether natural or adoptive, no presumption
shall apply as to who will better promote the interest and welfare of
the child.”); Rosero v. Blake, 581 S.E.2d 41, 50 (N.C. 2003) (noting
that the common law presumption that vested custody of a
nonmarital child in the mother had been abrogated and holding
“that the father’s right to custody of his illegitimate child is legally
equal to that of the child’s mother”). Remarkably, trial judges con
tinue to award custody in overt violation of current law. See, e.g.,
Greer v. Greer, 624 S.E.2d 423, 428-29 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (re
versing trial court’s custody award for its reliance on its findings
that “the law of nature dictates that early in the life of a child, the
mother has a distinct advantage in the opportunity to care for that
child” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
North Dakota: North Dakota recently updated its custody statute.
Although the revisions did not alter North Dakota’s approach to
custody (no presumption of joint custody, no distinctions between
mothers and fathers), the statute now focuses on more cooperative
parenting, provides for the option of a court-mandated parenting
coordinator, and removes previous distinctions between marital and
nonmarital children. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-29(1) (Supp. 2010)
(“Between the mother and father, whether married or unmarried,
there is no presumption as to whom will better promote the best
interests and welfare of the child.”); id. § 14-09-31(2) (“If the par
ents cannot agree on an allocation of decisionmaking responsibility,
the court shall enter an order allocating decisionmaking responsibil
ity in the best interests of the child.”); id. § 14-09.2-02 (“[T]he
court, upon its own motion or by motion or agreement of the par
ties, may appoint a parenting coordinator to assist the parties in
resolving issues or disputes related to parenting time.”); P.A. v.
A.H.O., 757 N.W.2d 58, 63 (N.D. 2008) (“Whether or not joint cus
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tody is in the best interests of a child depends on the facts and cir
cumstances of the particular case.”); see also N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-09-04 (2004) (repealed 2009) (“The father and mother of a le
gitimate unmarried minor child are entitled equally to its custody
. . . .”); id. § 14-09-05 (repealed 2009) (“When maternity and pater
nity of an illegitimate child are positively established, the custody
rights must be equal as between mother and father . . . .”); INTERIM
JUDICIAL PROCESS COMM., EXCERPT FROM 2009 LEGISLATIVE
COUNCIL REPORT, SENATE BILL NO. 2042, S. 61, at 4 (N.D. 2009),
available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/61-2009/bill-status/
senate/SB2042.PDF (“The committee concluded that the bill draft
that would require the court to use a rebuttable presumption that
joint custody is in the best interests of the child should not be rec
ommended to the Legislative Council.”).
Ohio: OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.03 (West 2005) (“When hus
band and wife are living separate and apart from each other, or are
divorced, . . . they shall stand upon an equality as to the parental
rights and responsibilities for the care of their children and the
place of residence and legal custodian of their children, so far as
parenthood is involved.”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(A),
(B)(1) (West Supp. 2010) (providing for the allocation of sole or
shared parenting rights but not for a presumption of either). The
Ohio courts have stated that section 3109.03 does not apply to un
married parents. See, e.g., In re Brown, No. 13-08-46, 2009 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1840, at *8-9 (Ohio Ct. App. May 11, 2009). Further,
Ohio law mandates that “[a]n unmarried female who gives birth to
a child is the sole residential parent and legal custodian of the child
until a court of competent jurisdiction issues an order designating
another person as the residential parent and legal custodian.”
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.042 (West 2005). Both unmarried
parents stand on “equal footing” during the initial custody proceed
ing. Id. However, the default custody award to the unmarried
mother will not change until further order of the court. See id.; Self
v. Turner, No. 10-06-07, 2006 WL 3392077, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Nov. 27, 2006). Acknowledgement or adjudication of paternity pre
sumably would not effect any change of such a “default status.” See
In re J.S., No. 07CA0035, 2007 WL 4225419, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App.
Dec. 3, 2007) (holding that unmarried father could not assume legal
custody “solely on the basis of the establishment of paternity”);
Self, 2006 WL 3392077, at *3.
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Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112(C)(2) (West Supp.
2010) (“There shall be neither a legal preference nor a presumption
for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody, or sole cus
tody.”). Oklahoma recently repealed a statutory provision that
provided for automatic custody of a nonmarital child with the un
married mother. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6 (West 2007) (re
pealed 2009) (“Except as otherwise provided by law, the mother of
an unmarried minor child born out of wedlock is entitled to the
care, custody, services and earnings and control of such minor.”).
Prior to its repeal, the statute did not control once “the [unmarried]
father and his parental rights [were] in issue,” and the court “[had]
discretion to award custody to either parent.” Dep’t Human Servs.
ex rel. Martin v. Chronister, 945 P.2d 511, 513 & n.2 (Okl. Civ. App.
1997); see also Miles v. Young, 818 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Okl. Civ. App.
1991) (holding that unmarried father’s compliance with adoption
statute resulted in child’s being “deemed for all purposes legitimate
from the time of birth” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(a) (2007) (“When appropri
ate, the court shall recognize the value of close contact with both
parents and encourage joint parental custody and joint responsibil
ity for the welfare of the children.”); id. § 107.169(3) (“The court
shall not order joint custody, unless both parents agree to the terms
and conditions of the order.”); In re Marriage of Sigler, 889 P.2d
1323, 1326 (Or. Ct. App. 1995) (finding that wife’s objection to joint
custody was all that was required to satisfy statute). Once paternity
is established, “the [unmarried] father shall have the same rights as
a father who is or was married to the mother of the child.” OR.
REV. STAT. § 109.094; see also id. § 109.103(1) (“[Unmarried] par
ents have the same rights and responsibilities regarding the custody
. . . [of] their child that married or divorced parents would have, and
the provisions of [sections] 107.093 to 107.425 that relate to custody
. . . apply to the proceeding.”). Although there is no maternal cus
tody award or presumption for nonmarital children, it’s likely that
the legal custody provision for unmarried parents has that effect.
See id. § 109.175 (“If paternity of a child born out of wedlock is
established . . . the parent with physical custody at the time [pro
ceedings are initiated] . . . [or] at the time of the filing of the volun
tary acknowledgment of paternity, has sole legal custody until a
court specifically orders otherwise.”).
Pennsylvania: 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West Supp. 2010)
(providing for custody awards); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304
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(West 2001) (“An order for shared custody may be awarded by the
court when it is in the best interest of the child . . . .”); Schwarcz v.
Schwarcz, 548 A.2d 556, 563 n.16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (no pre
sumption in favor of shared custody); Commonwealth ex rel. Scott
v. Martin, 381 A.2d 173, 174 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977) (“[T]he mother
of an illegitimate child does not have a greater right to custody of
that child than its natural father.”); see also Masser v. Miller, 913
A.2d 912, 921 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (applying section 5303 to un
married parents in modification and removal proceeding).
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2003) (providing for cus
tody of children); Dupre v. Dupre, 857 A.2d 242, 261 (R.I. 2004)
(“[T]he trial court should be free to adopt the [custody] arrange
ment that it determines best promotes the child’s interests.”).
Rhode Island cases do not explore joint custody awards at length,
but the decisions show that the court may award joint custody to
both married an unmarried parents. Parker v. Williams, 896 A.2d
44, 46-48 (R.I. 2006) (discussing lower court’s joint custody award
to unmarried parents); Hurley v. Hurley, 610 A.2d 80, 86-87 (R.I.
1992) (upholding joint custody award to married parents); see also
Dupre, 857 A.2d at 260-61 (“In initial custody and placement deter
minations, the focus is squarely on the best interests of the child,
and the parents come before the court on an equal footing . . . .”).
South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1985) (providing for
custody awards in divorce proceedings); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-3
530(A)(42) (2010) (“The family court has exclusive jurisdiction . . .
to order joint or divided custody where the court finds it is in the
best interests of the child . . . .”). Joint custody awards are generally
disfavored in South Carolina. Scott v. Scott, 579 S.E.2d 620, 624
(S.C. 2003) (acknowledging South Carolina’s position but uphold
ing joint custody award); see also Patel v. Patel, 599 S.E.2d 114, 121
(S.C. 2004) (“[J]oint or divided custody should only be awarded
where there are exceptional circumstances.”). South Carolina’s re
luctance to award joint custody seems to be focused on the residen
tial components of joint custody. See Scott, 579 S.E.2d at 624;
Arnal v. Arnal, 609 S.E.2d 821, 825 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (discussing
lower court’s joint legal custody award to divorcing parents). South
Carolina, in 2008, formally abolished the tender years doctrine.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-15-10 (2010).
South Dakota: The trial court is authorized to enter an order of
joint legal custody, which can address residential responsibilities.
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-7.1 (2004) (statutory authority for mar
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ried parties); Alexander v. Hamilton, 525 N.W.2d 41, 47 (S.D. 1994)
(applying section 25-5-7.1 to unmarried parents). South Dakota
does distinguish between married and unmarried parents and pro
vides for default maternal custody awards for nonmarital children.
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-5-7 (Supp. 2009) (“[T]he father and
mother of any minor child born in wedlock are equally entitled to
the child’s custody, service, and earnings.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 25-5-10 (2004) (“The mother of an unmarried minor born out of
wedlock is entitled to its custody, services, and earnings subject to
the court’s right to award custody of the child to either parent
. . . .”); Alexander, 525 N.W.2d at 47 (noting statute’s award of cus
tody of nonmarital child to unmarried mother); see also S.D. CODI
FIED LAWS § 25-8-46 (2004) (“In all [records of nonmarital
children], it shall be sufficient for all purposes to refer to the
mother as the parent having the sole custody of the child or to the
child as being in the sole custody of the mother . . . .”). Although
South Dakota maintains this default maternal custody award, when
custody is contested, courts have no preference for mothers or fa
thers regardless of marital status. See Berger v. Van Winsen, 743
N.W.2d 136, 138 (S.D. 2007) (“Between parents adversely claiming
custody, neither may be preferred over the other.” (citation and in
ternal quotation marks omitted)).
Tennessee: TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(a)(1) (Supp. 2009)
(“[T]he court may . . . award the care, custody and control of such
child or children to either of the parties to the suit or to both parties
in the instance of joint custody or shared parenting . . . .”); id. § 36
6-101(a)(2)(A)(i) (“[N]either a preference nor a presumption for or
against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody is
established . . . .”). Tennessee provides for a default maternal cus
tody award for nonmarital children. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-2-303
(2005) (“Absent an order of custody to the contrary, custody of a
child born out of wedlock is with the mother.”); Huntzinger v.
Parham, No. M2009-00045-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 175108, at *5
(Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2010); In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 872
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).
Texas: TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 101.024(a) (Vernon 2008) (“ ‘Par
ent’ means the mother, a man presumed to be the father, a man
legally determined to be the father, a man who has been adjudi
cated to be the father by a court of competent jurisdiction, a man
who has acknowledged his paternity under applicable law, or an
adoptive mother or father.”); id. § 153.131(b) (“It is a rebuttable
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presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint
managing conservators is in the best interest of the child.”); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134(a) (Vernon Supp. 2009) (“[T]he court
may render an order appointing the parents joint managing
conservators . . . .”).
Utah: UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10.2(1) (2007) (“The court may or
der joint legal custody or joint physical custody or both . . . .”). The
Utah joint custody statute once provided for a rebuttable presump
tion in favor of joint legal custody but later repealed that provision.
Thronson v. Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 432 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); see
also UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10(5) (Supp. 2009) (“This section es
tablishes neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint
legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody . . . .”). Al
though Thronson held that parental agreement was a prerequisite
to any award of joint legal custody, Thronson, 810 P.2d at 433, the
current statute does not contain this requirement. See UTAH CODE
ANN. § 30-3-10.2(1); Act of Mar. 15, 2001, 2001 Ut. ALS 126
(LEXIS). Although the statutory scheme does not explicitly pro
vide for joint custody awards for unmarried parents, it appears that
these awards are authorized in practice. See UTAH GUIDELINES,
ESTABLISHING COURT-ORDERED PATERNITY: A GUIDE FOR UN
MARRIED PARENTS 3 (2009), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/
mediation / cpm / docs / CMP - Paternity - Unmarried_Parents _ Guide.
pdf; Utah Legal Servs., Domestic Law Handbook, Parentage/
Custody, http://www.utahlegalservices.org/public/self-help-web
pages/domestic-law-handbook#Parentage (last modified Aug. 10,
2009); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-15-113 (2008) (stating that once
a “tribunal determines that the alleged father is the father, it may
. . . order parent-time rights in accordance with” the parenting-time
provisions in the divorce statute).
Vermont: Vermont courts will not award joint custody unless both
parents agree. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(a) (2002) (“When the
parents cannot agree to divide or share parental rights and respon
sibilities, the court shall award parental rights and responsibilities
primarily or solely to one parent.”); Cabot v. Cabot, 697 A.2d 644,
649-51 (Vt. 1997); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 666(a) (“Any
agreement between the parents which divides or shares parental
rights and responsibilities shall be presumed to be in the best inter
ests of the child.”); see also Heffernan v. Harbeson, 861 A.2d 1149,
1153 (Vt. 2004) (concluding that section 665(a) applies to parentage
actions); Cloutier v. Blowers, 783 A.2d 961, 963 (Vt. 2001) (apply
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ing Cabot to custody award of nonmarital child). This restriction,
however, is limited to joint decision making, and the court may
fashion custody awards that afford each parent a discrete zone of
authority in different areas of the child’s life. See Chase v. Bowen,
945 A.2d 901, 913-15 (Vt. 2008) (upholding lower court’s award of
legal rights and responsibilities to father and physical rights and re
sponsibilities to mother because the award “[did] not force the par
ents to share decision-making authority”).
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Supp. 2009) (“In deter
mining custody . . . there shall be no presumption or inference of
law in favor of either [parent]. . . . The court may award joint cus
tody or sole custody.”); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 592,
595 (Va. 2000) (“[U]pon birth of an illegitimate child, the right of
the natural mother to immediate custody is superior.”).
Washington: In Washington, custody orders are implemented
through parenting plans, which provide for residential and decisionmaking responsibilities. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.050(1)
(West Supp. 2010); id. § 26.09.184(5), (6). For mutual decisionmaking authority, see id. § 26.09.184(5)(a) (“The [permanent
parenting] plan shall allocate decision-making authority to one or
both parties regarding the children’s education, health care, and re
ligious upbringing.”); id. § 26.09.187(2) (identifying factors to con
sider). The courts will allocate residential and decision-making
authority to unmarried parents, although parenting plans are not
required. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.130(7) (West 2005)
(addressing residential provisions); Dugger v. Lopez, 173 P.3d 967,
970 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (noting lower court’s award of joint deci
sion making to unmarried parents).
West Virginia: W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-207(b) (LexisNexis 2009)
(“If each of the child’s legal parents has been exercising a reason
able share of parenting functions for the child, the court shall pre
sume that an allocation of decision-making responsibility to both
parents jointly is in the child’s best interests.”). Section 48-1-232
defines “legal parent” as “an individual defined as a parent, by law,
on the basis of biological relationship, presumed biological relation
ship, legal adoption or other recognized grounds,” and presumably
includes unwed parents. Id. § 48-1-232; see also Kessel v. Leavitt,
511 S.E.2d 720, 799 (W. Va. 1998) (“[T]he jurisprudential history of
this State indicates that we have abandoned [non-marital] gender
preferences and have long recognized the rights of both parents,
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mothers and fathers alike, to the custody of their children, provided
the parents are fit to have custody . . . .”).
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(1)(b) (West 2009) (providing
that custody statute applies to divorce and paternity proceedings);
id. § 767.41(2)(am) (“[T]he court shall presume that joint legal cus
tody is in the best interest of the child.”).
Wyoming: WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(a) (2009) (“In granting a
divorce, . . . or upon the establishment of paternity . . . , the court
may make by decree or order any disposition of the children that
appears most expedient and in the best interests of the children.”);
id. § 20-2-201(d) (“Custody shall be crafted to promote the best in
terests of the children, and may include any combination of joint,
shared or sole custody.”). There is no maternal preference rule. Id.
§ 20-2-201(b) (“In any proceeding in which the custody of a child is
at issue the court shall not prefer one (1) parent as a custodian
solely because of gender.”); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 92 P.3d 298, 306
(Wyo. 2004) (“[A] gender based, maternal preference in custody
awards is a mistake of law . . . .”). The custody provisions apply to
unmarried parents. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201(a); In re K.R.A.,
85 P.3d 432, 439 (Wyo. 2004) (upholding shared custody award of
nonmarital child).

